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The Duality of Social Identity: Theories Concerning Self and Social 
Categorization.
This investigation examines th e  process of ethnic identity 
formation as a specific manifestation of social identity. It is the  
author’s hypothesis tha t individuals are able to  capitalize on 
inherent ambiguities, crea ted  by the  multilevel nature of social 
identity, to  gain mobility within a given culture.
To illustrate how widespread this phenomenon truly is, th ree  
cases, from three unique temporal contexts are examined. The first 
example refers to  the  development of the  Rastafarian ethnic identity 
in post-colonial Jamaica. The second case comes from the  Canadian 
Metis, as a result of the fur trade economy. Lastly, I have 
scrutinized th e  current situation in Northern Ireland to  dem onstrate  
why the  Ulster Unionists have repeatedly blocked a t tem p ts  to  unite 
the  island of Ireland.
To fully comprehend the  phenomenon of ethnicity it is important to  
focus on th e  transitional periods where identities are challenged. In 
some cases  specific minority identities are in jeopardy of being 
absorbed into th e  majority population, in others, th e  particular 
group is able to  maintain autonomy by retreating from the context of 
conflic t.
Through th ese  cases, I will dem onstra te  th a t  ethnicity is 
contextually defined, so th a t  the  only time th a t  ethnicity appears to  
be primordial or s ta tic  is when it is removed from its unique 
historical con tex t.
Chairperson: Dr. Greg Campt
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Introduction
On Social Influence
A few years ago, I became interested in the  types of influence
th a t groups could exert over their individual members. I was
particularly amazed a t how quickly a ‘mob mentality’ could
overcome an otherwise peaceful crowd; turning it into a violent and
destructive entity. To the  bystanders, it seem s like calmer heads
should prevail, but time and again this proves not to be the case. It
is almost as if a new force is created when we form groups, a force
which compels even the most disciplined to  act in ways tha t would
not be considered acceptable under normal circumstances.
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One place where this social phenomenon is becoming 
increasingly apparent is in the  pro tracted  ethnic conflicts th a t  
litter the  world today. I believe th a t ethnic fighting is only going to  
intensify as populations surge and com pete for limited resources.
To counter this trend, I believe th a t  it is extremely important to  
intensify the  dialogue we have already s ta r ted  surrounding social 
identity, especially as it relates to  ethnicity.
S ta te m e n t  of Problem
Much of the  confusion concerning current conceptions of 
ethnicity s tem s from the  lack of any well established, uniform for 
criteria for defining ethnic identity. Yet this task  has not proved to  
be as easy as it may sound. For one thing, ethnic identity has been 
known to  exist on more than one level simultaneously.
In today 's  global society, all people are members of more than 
one social group at any given time. In o ther words, ethnicity must 
be understood in term s of the  broader category known as social 
identity. However, current theories concerning ethnic identity tend 
not to  recognize th e  multidimensional nature of social identity. 
Instead they seem  to  trea t  ethnic identities as bounded, s ta tic
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entities when, in reality, the  only time th a t  they appear to  remain 
constan t is when they  are completely removed from their particular 
historical contexts.
Another thing which has persistently confounded the  study of 
social phenomena relates to  th e  fact tha t many of our perceptions 
and behaviors are context dependent. This being the case, it 
becom es difficult to  make broad generalizations about human social 
behavior because there are too  many variables to  account for when 
one looks to  make cross-cultural comparisons. The bes t th a t  we can 
hope for is to  make controlled comparisons by carefully selecting 
the  qualities we wish to  contrast.
Research in the  area of social identity theory (Tajfel e t  al., 
1971; Turner, 1975) indicates th a t  sub jects  characteristically hold 
divergent perceptions of in-groups (i.e. groups to  which they 
belonged) and out-groups, irregardless of how they are defined. For 
the  m ost part, subjects tend to  describe members of their own 
groups in much greater detail than they would members of another 
group. The end result of this differential process of differential 
attribution is prejudicial behavior. As such, whole groups of 
individuals can become units of competition and group membership
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then becom es a political tool which can be utilized by the individual 
to  secure mobility within society.
To b e t te r  understand th e  ramifications of social identity, it is 
crucial to  recognize tha t ethnicity is defined along two distinct, yet 
in terdependent lines. The first, social categorization, is ascribed 
from without and is strongly reduction ists . The second, self­
categorization, is a personal attribution, held by the  individual, 
which reflects their social loyalties. This apparent dichotomy of 
social identity inevitably leads to  the  formation of groups based on 
commonalities, often incorporating shared elem ents of ancestry, 
language, and culture. Perhaps more importantly though, it also 
gives rise to  an out-group based on differences.
For the  purpose of this study, I have selected  three specific 
contex ts  of conflict between dominant and minority ethnicities for 
the  purpose of identifying the  duality of social identity. One place 
where this duality become particularly noticeable is in the  
definitions and attributions th e  two respective populations hold 
towards each other. In effect, the  boundaries th a t  maintain various 
social groups can be seen to  vary depending on who is doing the 
defining.
5
M e th o d s
My sample for this examination is comprised of three discrete, 
minority ethnicities which are in constan t conflict with the  
dominant population. The first case which I analyze is th a t  of the  
Rastafarians. It is my contention tha t this identity has its roots in 
th e  culture of domination which existed for centuries in Jamaica, 
though its current manifestation is more a product of economic 
oppression.
The second case I draw upon comes from the post-fur trade 
Metis. These proud people have repeatedly been denied their basic 
Aboriginal rights by th e  Canadian government, yet through continued 
resistance they have been able to  win token recognition as a legal 
en tity .
The third and final example I look at is th a t  of th e  current 
conflict in Northern Ireland. At this time, it looks as though the 
entire island of Ireland is, in the  near future, going to  become united 
and free of British control. If this does in fact occur, it will bring 
to  an end a struggle which has literally defined the  two populations 
inhabiting Northern Ireland; th e  Ulster Unionists and the  Republican 
Catholics.
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The methods, which I have employed, in the  course of this 
study have been primarily ethnohistorical in nature. I fee! th a t  by 
scrutinizing th e  development of th e se  th ree  specific ethnicities I 
will be able to  te a se  out the  essential dichotomy, produced by social 
conflict, which eventually leads to  discrimination.
Social Identity
On March 24, 1999 combined N.A.T.O. forces, led primarily by 
the  United S ta tes , began an all-air assault in the  former territory of 
Yugoslavia. The purpose of Operation Allied Force was to  destroy or 
significantly degrade th e  military-industrial s tru c tu re  of Serbian 
president Slobodan Milosevic. In the  months prior to  this action, 
Milosevich had used military and paramilitary troops to  depopulate 
the  ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo. Unfortunately, examples of 
this type of ethnic cleansing are becoming alarmingly frequent as 
flourishing populations force people to  migrate, en mass, all over
7
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the  world. As cultures come into contact, many times they clash. 
Some of these  conflicts have gone on for thousands of years and 
some are the  product of recent developments.
Whatever the  case, it seem s to  me of the  u tm ost importance to  
examine the  nature of such conflicts in an a t tem p t to  understand 
how these  social (i.e. ethnic) identities can become so powerful as 
to  make us slaughter each other by the hundreds of thousands to  
pro tect and promote them.
So why do we form groups; what is it th a t compels us to  seek 
the  affiliation of others? Some researchers (Griev & Hogg, 1999) 
have proposed the  idea th a t  by associating with a group we give 
meaning to  the  world by differentiating it. Others propose tha t, by 
affiliating with positively valued groups we further our own self- 
image (Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1975).
To these  theories I would ju st like to  add my own insight into 
the  complex nature of social identity. It is my contention tha t 
social identity is defined along two distinct, ye t interrelated lines. 
The first, social-categorization com es from outside the  group 
boundary and is, for all practical purposes, cast onto  said group, 
despite th e  wishes of its members. Social-categorization is part
9
and parcel of the  language of domination; it is symptomatic of 
outside in terests  being imposed onto the  individual members of a 
subordinate group.
The o ther side of social identity, I would argue, is constructed  
by individuals who comprise the  in-group and is more of a process of 
self-categorization. Furthermore, it becom es evident, in the 
individual’s choice of affiliation, how they view them selves. In 
other words, through choices concerning self-categorization we are 
provided with a clue to  the  person’s self-concept.
However, on this point, let me caution th a t  there  are tacit 
limitations placed on th e  individual when seeking social identity. 
Obviously, before an individual can become part of a group and begin 
to  draw on its identity, which is available to  its members, the  group 
must validate the  individual’s membership. That is, ju s t  because I 
may want to  belong to  a given group does not always guarantee tha t 
they  will welcome me into their ranks.
In any event, the  end result of this dual process of social 
identity formation is th e  establishm ent of essentially two relevant 
categories; ‘us and them’ . Consequently, we see the  construction 
and maintenance of obvious boundaries (Barth, 1969) between social
10
groups. This is evident in the adoption of symbols, speech and 
behaviors th a t  make the dividing line immediately noticeable. 
Moreover, this type of polarization is what eventually leads to  the  
level of conflict th a t  we see  today in places like Kosovo and 
Northern Ireland, to  name just a few.
It is important to  note however, th a t  by drawing th ese  lines 
between groups, it allows us to  depersonalize our image of 
individuals who are not like ‘us’. And once this has occurred it 
becom es significantly easier to  rationalize their persecution, either 
through violent conflict or through institutionalized social 
sanctions which subtly inhibit their ability to  com pete. Evidence of 
this effect has been empirically dem onstra ted  by Tajfel et al.
(1971) who found that,
under certain conditions th e  mere classification of 
sub jects  into the  in- and outgroupers is a sufficient as 
well as necessary condition to  induce forms of ingroup 
favoritism and discrimination against the  outgroup 
(Turner, 1975: 5).
The significant aspec t of this finding is th a t  mere 
classification is all th a t  is required to  produce differential 
behavior. By creating oversimplified categories and pigeon-holing
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people into those  imposed divisions we crea te  an environment which 
is ripe for discrimination to  exist. This being the  case, I think it 
appropriate to  examine some of the  more subtle features of this 
process of differentiation which is so  central to  th e  concept of 
social identity. For, if we ever hope to  reduce the  effects of 
prejudice, we need first to  recognize the  cognitive processes th a t 
give rise to  discrimination. Only then will we be able to  figure out 
the  appropriate measures necessary to  mitigate this effect.
Social C o m p ariso n
Before continuing on any further, I think it pertinent to
address certain issues concerning the  way th a t  the  human mind
processes information because it directly relates to  the  phenomena
of social comparison.
Now, it almost goes without saying tha t, we understand
various concepts in term s of their polar opposites. In other words,
we know ‘good’ in its relation to  ‘bad’, however it is important to
recognize th a t  th e se  are really not mutually exclusive categories;
they are instead ju s t relative points along a continuum.
Unfortunately, this type of uncertainty does not sit well with us. To
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the  contrary, we seek finite designations when handling incoming 
information, so we impose a so rt of false dichotomy which literally 
transform s th e  world into a series of essential dualisms, strongly 
oriented towards difference.
Universally speaking, an unidentified landscape makes very 
little sense  to  us, so creating cognitive categories and placing 
information into them becom es one of our primary functions. As 
such, “identity em erges from the  context of intergroup relations. 
Thus one defines oneself as th e  member of an in-group vis-a-vis an 
out-group” (Deaux, 1993: 4).
In both the  disciplines of cultural anthropology and cultural 
psychology, it has been hypothesized tha t the  human brain interprets 
the  physical world in term s of cognitive schemata. Such schem ata 
are b es t  thought of as conceptual structures which facilitate the  
classification of objects and even ts  into an understandable order. 
Therefore, schem as are a t the  very root of behavior because we act 
on the  basis of what we perceive to  be true. For instance, we 
employ schema in pursuit of the  goals th a t  we ultimately adopt.
Furthermore, schema can be seen to  vary between cultures 
because, “the learning of motives is a result of the  experience of the
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infant and child as shaped by socialization and parental 
identifications” (D’Andrade, 1992: 37). Thus, the  rudiments of the  
particular cultural model are frequently apparent in everyday 
discourse.
However, in certain instances, when the  mind lacks an 
appropriate cognitive category in which to  place new information, it 
is forced to  either redefine the  param eters of said category or alter 
th e  perception so th a t  it fits within the  preexisting cognitive 
structures. In other words, information tha t challenges the 
param eters of our social categories can at times force a revolution, 
or a t  least redefinition, of our cognitive representations. At other 
times though, it seem s tha t, “once internalized, it appears tha t 
cultural schem as are difficult to  abandon or even modulate” 
(D’Andrade, 1992: 40).
This specific theory of information processing can be traced 
back, a t  least to  the  work of twentieth  century French psychologist, 
Jean Piaget, who expounded th e  related concepts of assimilation and 
accommodation.
Assimilative activity transform s a given input into 
objects th a t  correspond to  the  person’s structure of
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knowing. Accommodative activity transforms the  
organism according to  th e  particular characteristics 
of the input. When this input, as in the  case of 
perception, consists of sensory data, it is part of the 
accommodative activity to  adjust itself to  the  
particular configuration of th ese  data. Such 
correspondence to  the  outside s ta te  can be literally 
observed in the  accommodation of sense organs, as for 
instance in the adjustm ent of the  eye to  the  various 
visual characteristics of a seen object, its distance, 
brightness, shape (Furth, 1969: 135).
In short, if incoming information is consistent with a 
preexisting cognitive category then it is merely a m atte r  of 
assimilating the  data into th a t  division. But if the  mind lacks an 
appropriate category in which to  store new data, then it may be 
forced to  m uta te  the  cognitive structures to  accommodate it.
The reason tha t I mention this is tha t it directly impacts the 
way th a t  we classify information about our own group and 
consequently define the  ‘o th e rs ’. Which is to  say that, “an individual 
defines himself as well as o thers  in term s of his location within a 
system  of social categories” (Turner, 1975). As a result, the  
standards of our own group provide the  point of reference for 
defining the  boundaries and judging the  out-group.
Moreover, because the  in-group becomes part of the  self-
concept (Smith & Henry, 1996), it is important to  have a favorable 
opinion of those  groups to  which we belong. Otherwise we are 
motivated to  abandon previous loyalties in favor of membership in 
groups with a positive image. In support of this point, Tajfel e t  a/, 
have shown that,
when subjects have a choice between acting in term s 
of maximum utilitarian advantages to  all (MJP) 
combined with maximum utilitarian advantage to  
members of their own group (MIP) as against having 
their group win on points a t the  sacrifice of both 
these  advantages, it is winning tha t seem s to  be more 
important to  them ” (1971, 172).
These researchers go on to  explain th a t  subjects were even 
consciously aware of alternative s tra teg ies , which makes their 
behavior even more remarkable. What this says to  me is tha t image 
(both group and self) is the  preeminent behavioral motivator.
Another function of social comparison is th a t  it allows th e  
individual to  draw on social groups as a source of information 
concerning normative behavior. That is, “people strive to  feel 
certain th a t  they are correct so th a t  they may ascribe meaning to  
their world and their place within it and thus be able to  interact 
adaptively with their environment” (Grieve & Hogg, 1999: 927).
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Thus, it is against the  backdrop of in-group norms tha t we 
contrast our own beliefs and judge their correctness.
An important cognitive consequence of this 
pervasiveness is th a t  the  articulation of an individual’s 
social world in term s of its categorization into groups 
becom es a guide for his conduct in situations to  which 
some criteria of intergroup division can be 
meaningfully applied. ( ‘Meaningful’ need not be 
‘rational’.) An undifferentiated social environment 
makes very little sense and provides no guidelines for 
action” (Tajfel e t  al. , 1971: 153).
Furthermore, there are multiple types of information th a t  the  
group can provide for individual members.
Social comparison is a process by which people seek 
informational influence. But we can see  now tha t 
people really seek  two kinds of information, broadly 
speaking: (1) information th a t  validates, or gives 
comfort th a t  they are already correct or close to  it; and 
(2) information th a t  evaluates, or more truly instructs 
them  about the  appropriateness of their subjective 
attitudes. Generally, both kinds of information can be 
gained by social comparison with like-minded people 
(Zimbardo & Leippe, 1991: 134).
In addition to  the  fact th a t  we look to  others to  confirm th a t 
our opinions are correct, or in line with th e  group norms, we also try 
to  make sure th a t  our beliefs are in line with what we personally 
hold to  be true. In other words, they must be consistent with our
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individual underlying cognitive realities, which is perhaps why 
certain social attributions are so hard to  dislodge. Hence, the  
epistemological categories th a t  we crea te  through social 
comparison effect, to  varying degrees, th e  way tha t we handle 
incoming information. So in effect, we are primed to  accept some 
attributions more readily than others.
However, in the  event th a t  our perceptions and those of the  
group are inconsistent, anxiety and dissonance are produced.
C ogn itive  D isso n a n ce
Cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Aronson, 1972) is a
phenomena th a t  occurs when we hold two beliefs, a t the  same time,
th a t  are obviously contradictory. This situation eventually produces
a type of psychic tension th a t  we can ac t to  resolve by rationalizing
a sort of bridge between the  various dissonant concepts. Because of
this phenomena, much information th a t does not match our
preconceived notions or s te reo types  can be rather easily explained
away and in effect, lost.
For instance, let us ju st say for argum ents sake th a t  I believed
th a t Americans are industrious and have worked their way to  the
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head of the world market. And then I found out tha t American 
schoolchildren rank low on aptitude te s t s  compared with 
schoolchildren from other industrialized nations. I might reconcile 
these  two disparate s ta tem e n ts  by concluding th a t  imagination is 
more important than knowledge or tha t hard work makes up for 
ignorance.
More likely though, I would question the  validity of the  finding 
on methodological or other grounds. In this manner I could shrug off 
disconfiming evidence by referring to  its conceptual flaws.
Another problem recognized by dissonance theory is th a t 
oftentimes, we tend to  errantly assume th a t other people perceive 
events or information in just the  same way we do. In so doing, we 
essentially ignore th e  fact tha t,
people are not passive receptacles for the deposition of 
information. The manner in which they  view and 
interpret information depends on how deeply they are 
com mitted to  a particular belief or course of action.
Individuals will d istort th e  objective world in order to  
reduce their dissonance (Aronson, 1972: 184).
One of the  ways th a t  we distort the  objective world is by 
employing s te reo types th a t  are erroneous and unfortunately, many
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times self-fulfilling. Another popular method of distortion is to  be 
selective about the  sources, or types, of information which we 
expose ourselves to. In the  words of the  forefather of the  theory, 
Leon Festinger,
if (a person) is led, for one reason or another, to  expect 
(an information source) will produce cognitions which 
will increase consonance, he will expose himself to  the  
information source. If the  expectation is tha t the 
cognition acquired through this source would increase 
dissonance, he will avoid it (1957: 128).
Though we may not always recognize it, prejudice can work in 
very subtle ways. For instance, it can influence, through cognitive 
dissonance, the  way th a t  we interpret everyday experiences. And 
m ost frightening of all, it can be transm itted  to  future generations 
if it is not guarded against.
S te r e o ty p e  F orm ation
On a daily basis, the  mind is bombarded with much more
information than it can ever possibly a ttend  to. This crea tes  a 
situation where we are forced to  develop various s tra teg ies or 
heuristics for handling th e  relevant part of said information; 
essentially we are forced to  become cognitive misers for the  mere
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sake of economy. Unfortunately, in so doing we inevitably create 
oversimplified s te reo types  th a t  can become so entrenched, tha t 
information which contradicts them  is virtually disregarded. 
According to  Bertjan Doosje, Russell Spears, and Willem Koomen it 
was found that,
perceivers who receive negative sample information 
concerning the  in-group (and positive information about 
an out-group) may not only challenge this information 
in their central tendency judgements, but also may 
simultaneously try  to  com pensate for this 
disadvantageous situation by exaggerating the  expected 
variabilities within both the  in-group and the  out-group 
populations (1995: 643).
This means th a t  our minds are not easily changed; inconsistent 
data, which should challenge the  validity of certain s te reo types  is 
instead rather easily disregarded. Whatever the  case, it allows us 
to  harbor a host of misattributions, as room in the  working memory 
is a t a premium.
In addition to  this s tra teg y  of oversimplification is th e  fact 
th a t  attribution processes differ for in-groups and out-groups. It 
seem s that, “in general, we tend  to  see  members of out-groups as 
more similar to  each other than the  members of our own group”
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(Aronson,1972: 144). And I would argue tha t this is a direct result 
of the  use of simplifying hueristics. It would seem  th a t  we only 
have mental room for complex, heterogeneous perceptions of our own 
group. And in fact, Park and Rothbart have dem onstrated that, “men 
and women were more likely to  remember the  subordinate attribu tes 
of an in-group member than of an out-group member” (1982: 1051). 
Consequently, the  ‘o thers’ are often characterized by a relatively 
few shared traits.
“When we assign attribu tes to  a category, we s te reo ty p e” 
(Triandis, 1994). In effect, we limit the  amount of information we 
a ttend  to  and this leaves room for misinformation to  exist. Many 
times th e  misinformation is self-serving, in the  sense  th a t  it 
bolsters our own self-concept. So, in order to  counter the  
dehumanizing effect th a t  stereotyping can have on individuals which 
we perceive to  be different, we need to  be consciously aware of the 
fundamental biases, inherent in the  s te reo types th a t  we all harbor.
Furthermore, there  is evidence to  suggest that, at times when 
social identity is s tressed , s te reo type  consensus within the  group 
increases. A recent article by Haslam e t  at. detailed findings which 
indicate th a t ,
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Consensus appears to  derive from th e  ability of group 
life and group memberships to  s tructure  the  cognitions 
of individual perceivers, so th a t  they expect and seek 
actively to  coordinate their perceptions and behavior 
with others who share the  same group membership 
(1999 :816).
This means th a t belonging to  a group can impose a sort of 
filter, on th e  individual, through which information is screened.
This type of censored information is then passed on, through 
interpersonal communications (Schaller & Conway III, 1999), so th a t  
even individual contact between group members helps to  reify the 
preferred attributions. In extrem e cases, where dissenting opinions 
and contradictory images are absent, the  phenomena known as ‘group 
think’ can occur. So, to  counter extreme s te reo types from 
developing, it is crucial to  flood the  environment with positive 
images or information th a t  contradicts the  stigmatizing a ttitudes.
M u ltid im ensiona lity  o f  Social Id e n t i ty
Up until this point, experimental theories (Turner, 1975;
Tajfel e t  a/., 1971) concerning social identity, which would of 
course, include on some level ethnicity, have not been able to  
account for the  complexity of ‘real world’ manifestations in their 
experimental research. I believe th a t  this is because they have had
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trouble defining the  appropriate cultural unit needed for social 
comparison to  take place. They fail to  account for the  fact tha t 
social comparison can take place on may different levels, virtually 
simultaneously.
In a recent work, John Turner (1975) described three distinctly 
ab s trac ted  levels of self-categorization; they  were: human identity, 
social identity and personal identity. I would argue th a t  the  last of 
these  th ree  can be further dissected because m ost individuals 
posses a variety of identities th a t  can be subsumed under the 
heading of personal identity and in some cases this phenomena can 
be extended to  social identity. For, as Kay Deaux (1993: 5) has so 
diligently observed of Turner’s framework, “I see  the  distinction 
between personal and social as somewhat arbitrary and misleading. 
Rather than being cleanly separable, social and personal identity are 
fundamentally in te rre la ted”.
Additionally, m ost of th e  recent literature also fails to  
account for the  fact th a t  individuals can be scrupulous manipulators 
of their social identity. This notion is particularly evident in the  
fact tha t, “people can categorize themselves a t various levels of 
inclusiveness, ranging from th e  personal self to  broad social
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categories such as ethnic groups” (Smith & Henry, 1996: 635). At 
times, individuals are even capable of capitalizing on inherent 
ambiguities, created  by the  fact th a t  they may posses several 
independent identities, to  improve their position and mobility within 
society.
Thus knowing which identities a person claims is not 
enough. Information about the  position of an identity 
within the  overall s tructure may be an important 
predictor of affective s ta te ,  behavioral choice and 
response to  interventions (Deaux, 1993: 8).
The secondary aim of this paper is to  examine what I believe 
to  be the  larger question of group formation processes and the 
ramifications these  have on ste reo type development. I do not claim 
however, to  be the  first to  have recognized, “the need for more 
historical studies of ethnic groups to  analyze the  evolution of ethnic 
identities and the  role of social and economic circumstances 
relative to  psychological factors in shaping group identities”
(Cohen, 1984: 1029).
However, it is my contention tha t the  perceptions of individual 
group members significantly affect our understanding of, and 
a ttitudes towards ‘non-members’. As I have alluded to  earlier, these
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oversimplified, inaccurate attributions become reified through 
continued reinforcement within the  group and eventually 
discriminatory practices are adopted. Hopefully, by continuing the  
dialogue on the  foundations of prejudice we can begin to  see  what it 
will take to  move this discussion to  the  next level; th e  dissolution 
of discriminatory language and behavior.
Recently, it has occurred to  me tha t most of the  confusion 
concerning current conceptions of ethnicity stem  from the apparent 
lack of a well established, uniform criteria for defining ethnic 
identity. There is also little agreem ent concerning th e  appropriate 
unit of culture a t which to  compare any two given societies. To his 
credit, Raoul Naroll did identify six qualities th a t  characterize the  
fundamental cultural unit in a 1964  Current Anthropology article. 
They were as follows:
(1) Distribution of particular tra its  being studied.
(2) Territorial contiguity.
(3) Political organization.
(4) Language.
(5) Ecological adjustment.
(6) Local community structure(284).
Nevertheless, circum stances have changed significantly since
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the  mid-sixties. In th e  world today, cultures are coming into 
contact a t an unprecedented rate. Ideas and identities are mixing in 
many unique ways and the  existing theoretical framework 
surrounding ethnic identity seem s ill equipped to  account for the  
resulting complexity. Moreover, current conceptions of ethnic 
identity lack th e  ability to  account for the  fact th a t  a person is 
often a member of more than one group a t any given time and 
consequently may have numerous social identities to  draw upon. A 
fact th a t  will only become increasingly frequent as we move 
towards a global society.
Moreover, to  fully comprehend the  nature of social identity, we 
also have to  account for the  fact tha t there are several levels of 
social identity, beyond the  three th a t Turner (1975) has defined. In 
certain situations, subordinate identities can be lost or put aside in 
favor of a higher order identity, as was the  case with the  Christian 
Crusades. In this instance, feudal loyalties were temporarily put 
aside in favor of saving th e  Christian homeland from muslim 
invaders.
There also exists th e  possibility that, a t  times, higher order 
identities can become a disadvantage. If this is the  case, then we
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have the  option of retreating, and seeking solace in a minor identity 
which may be considered to  be more personal. An example of this 
can be found in minority group members who emphasize their 
minority heritage, in order to  secure financial assistance, even if 
they may feel no real connection to  tha t heritage.
In other words, social identity is not often a straightforward, 
easily described phenomena. Instead they are rather context 
dependent and impermanent. For proof of this, one only need check 
th e  number of times th a t  the  countries of the  world have 
reorganized them selves in th e  last century or two. In reality, the 
only time tha t ethnic identities appear to  remain constant, is when 
they  are totally removed from their individual historical contexts. 
Granted, some identities persist for longer than others, however 
ultimately, all are tem porary and culturally determined. Perhaps by 
examining th e  transitional periods, when ethnic identities are 
challenged, or more poignantly shift, it will become increasingly 
apparent just how fickle and fluid social identities (i.e. ethnic 
identities) really are.
To this end, the  case studies which I have selected  for this 
paper represen t th ree  unique situations in which dominant identities
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either give rise to  new ethnicities or are directly challenged by th e  
competing in te rests  of o ther burgeoning identities.
In order to  b e t te r  understand the  ramifications of social 
identity, we m ust remember th a t  ethnicity is defined along two 
distinct y e t in terdependent lines: social-categorization, which is 
ascribed from without and is seriously reductionistic, and self­
categorization which is partially governed by the  individual. Of the  
two, the  la tte r process of identity formation is much more complete 
and pliable.
This apparent dichotomy of social identity inevitably leads to  
the  formation of groups based on commonalities, often defined along 
ethnic lines. Perhaps more importantly though, it also gives rise to  
the  subsequent definition of an out-group based on difference. 
Differences which, we will see, become accen tuated  as newly 
spawned identities fight to  differentiate themselves.
R a c i a l i s a t i o n
One of the  most easily apprehended and widely employed axis 
of differentiation has typically been drawn along ‘racial’ lines. This 
distinction, which has little scientific basis, has been used since 
before we fully understood th e  intricate workings of genetic
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inheritance. Nevertheless, we are still able to  identify a, “social 
process of conferring social significance on th e se  visible markers. 
Racialisation is the  process of making physical differences into 
social markers and, typically, enforcing them  in a regime of 
oppression” (Fenton, 1999: 66).
As if by fiat, values have become assigned to  skin color and 
there is a repeating tendency to  underestimate the  amount of 
variation contained within the  various ‘races’. The myth tha t 
ability is somehow related to  skin color is rooted in specific 
colonial events, and even within the  ranks of academia there is a 
significant body of evidence which helps to  perpetuate  this attitude. 
Instead of focusing on the  common traits of all members of the 
sp ec ie s  Homo sapien sapien, we seem all to  ready to  focus on one 
trait th a t  has absolutely no bearing on intelligence or ability.
What the  layman fails to  appreciate, in the  emphasis on skin 
coloration, is th a t  observable differences within th e  world’s 
population are the  result of relatively long periods of geographic 
isolation throughout the  history of our species and normal 
evolutionary processes acting within these  populations. That is, we 
know tha t,
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Evolution works through gradual change and the  gradual 
branching of family trees , combined with interbreeding 
between groups, resulting in an array of populations 
which resemble one o ther to  varying degrees like the  
branches of any family. In fact, th e  major premise of 
evolution is tha t we are all part of th e  same large 
family (Cohen, 1998: 42).
However th e se  circum stances do allow certain traits, like dark 
skin for example, to  cluster which means th a t  they are expressed 
with g reater frequency in certain parts of the  globe. Eventually, 
with enough generations, the  whole population inhabiting a given 
environment begins exhibiting a marked similarity, provided th a t  the  
environment does not change significantly and th a t  the  gene pool 
s tays somewhat static . The meaning of variation in skin coloration 
is further confounded by the  fact that,
genetic  similarities in visible or adaptive tra its  need 
not imply family relationships a t all. Some obvious 
‘racial’ tra its  actually seem  to  have originated several 
times and to  occur in populations th a t  are not 
otherwise very much alike. Thus, parallel skin color 
variations occur repeatedly in different parts of the  
world corresponding to  solar radiation, among people 
who otherwise have different traits  and appear 
historically unconnected (ibid.: 45).
The other trend tha t has developed in th e  last few years 
concerning social attribution is a strong backlash against ‘racial’
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mixing. It would seem  th a t  a t  the  sam e time mainstream America 
has been striving for g reater  integration and equal trea tm en t under 
the  law, various factions of extremist thought have gained 
popularity using the  rhetoric of hatred and preaching separation 
between the  races.
Perhaps these  groups are responding to  what they perceive to  
be a th rea t to  their autonomy by adopting an isolationistic 
philosophy. It could very well be th a t  they fear for the  integrity of 
their identity because they know th a t  they may very well fall prey 
to  a rapidly changing world order.
In any event, my reason for mentioning the  process of 
racialization is twofold. On the  one hand, I want to  bring it to  the 
reader’s a tten tion  th a t  ‘race’ is a social distinction which is weakly 
based on genetic inheritance and certainly dependent on 
environmental inputs. But in addition, I want to  point out th a t  racial 
attributions shares much in common with ethnically based 
attribution processes. For instance, both tend  to  impose boundaries 
based on shared ancestry, culture or language.
Even today, skin color is still employed as a very popular 
social marker, though in individual contexts  it can take on different
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values. Despite repeated  objections (from many different 
disciplines) th a t  it is not a valid scientific distinction, we are 
forced to  acknowledge the presence of this racial distinction as a 
sociological and psychological phenomena. The reality of the  m atte r  
is th a t  people of color are still fighting against negative 
stereo types , on a daily basis, which can inhibit their a t tem p ts  to  
advance in American society. In spite of our rhetoric, we fail to  
attain a situation where all have an equal footing. Oppression is 
still the  way of the  status quo , yet now it is carried on in a more 
subtle manner. The roadblocks tha t currently exist are veiled in 
secrecy as they still aim to  exploit.
One way th a t  any collectivity can fight with greater impact is 
by gaining new membership. By appealing to  a broader audience, or 
uniting disassociated factions against a common enemy, groups can 
gain clout; both within the confines of the  law and without. This 
being the  case, the  process known as ‘ethnogenesis’ can be seen as a 
s tra tegy  for gaining power in society. By rallying around the 
symbols of shared ancestry, language or culture, populations can be 
galvanized into a fierce unit of resistance to  the  status quo. Or if 
opportunity provides no shared elements of culture to  draw upon,
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then we are forced to  fashion new identities out of the  aggregate.
In the  relatively short history of our species, it has been 
advantageous to  keep our social groups fluid so th a t  we could endure 
periods of scarcity and disease. Therefore, to  t re a t  ethnic 
identities as anything but an adaptation to  changing social 
circumstances is to  miss th e  functional value of entering into social 
contract. The next section of this paper will do just tha t, it will 
examine the  process known as ‘ethnogenesis’ in the  context of 
conflict; as an adaptive s tra tegy  for dealing with a changing social 
landscape. It specifically focuses on what the  ethnic group can 
provide for its members, namely agency.
Ethnogenesis
Now that we have gone over some of the finer nuances of
social identity, I think it appropriate to  examine one specific level 
of this phenomenon; ethnicity. I contend tha t ethnicity is somewhat 
unique to  th e  realm of social identity in th a t  it is grounded, again to  
varying degrees, in shared ancestry, or common fate. It is not an 
a ltogether spurious designation, but in order to  endure, it must 
continually be maintained.
In 1971, William Sturtevant described the ethnogenesis of the  
Seminole Indians out of former Creek Indian populations. He
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explained tha t these  populations gradually acquiesced and eventually 
asserted  their independence while, a t  the  same time, receding to  the  
seclusion of a marginal environment (the Big Cypress swamp of 
central Florida) in order to  avoid being absorbed by expanding Euro- 
American se ttlem ents . In his own words,
The Seminole provide a striking instance of these  
transformations of Indian society and polity in 
response to  European pressures, for the  tribe is an 
entirely post-European phenomenon, a replacement by 
Creek se ttle rs  of th e  Florida aborigines whom they 
eliminated in frontier military campaigns growing out 
of antagonisms between European powers (Sturtevant, 
1971 :92).
In this one example, we have evidence of a t least three 
primary identities which are mutating as a result of their 
interactions. One identity, th a t  of the  Florida aborigines, was even 
in jeopardy of becoming extinct a t  one point. For this discussion, it 
is useful to  remember tha t, “every innovation, and thus all culture 
change, must be considered to  be a recombination of previously 
, existing configurations” (Wallace, 1970: 168). This, in part, 
explains why it is common practice to  draw on older, previously 
existing identities when forging new ones.
36
At this point in history, we cannot deny the fact th a t  all 
identities reflect th e  power relationships th a t  underlie and 
coincidentally produce them. In the  course of their interactions, 
some inevitably fall prey to  changing world conditions. Yet others 
are forged out of the  remnants of th a t  very struggle; a t times 
assimilating diverse populations and creating elaborate creoles.
As a result, the study of ethnic identity has, in the  past, been 
confounded by the fact th a t  identities can be either s tressed  or 
suppressed depending on the local climate. Moreover, because social 
identity is context dependent, individual actors are able to  gain 
power by strategically manipulating the  various identities th a t  we 
all come to  posses.
t
Human agency may be frail, especially among those 
with little power, but it happens daily and mundanely, 
and it deserves our attention. Humans’ capacity for 
self-objectification- and through objectification, for 
self-direction-plays into both their domination by 
social relations of power and their possibilities for 
(partial) liberation from th ese  forces (Holland et ai,
1998:5). j
As a result, individuals are sometim es able to  gain g reater 
access to  mobility within a given society. In support of this point,
Ellemers e ta / .  (1997) dem onstrated tha t individuals who did not 
strongly identify with an in-group showed an increased desire for 
mobility to  a higher s ta tu s  group.
In most instances of culture contact, the  newly encountered 
identity, or identities, are scrutinized by th e  respective populations 
to  see if they are, in fact, compatible with the  structure of schema, 
or motives, common to  them. Most of the  time, the  closer or more 
compatible th e  particular groups are, the  more cultural borrowing 
one can expect to  see. From a slightly different perspective,
a ‘donor’ culture p resen ts  a new cultural configuration 
to  the  recipient culture. The members of this culture 
then subject th e  new configurations to  various te s ts  
and sooner or later, accepts  it or rejects it (Wallace,
1970: 172).
At the  sam e time, we m ust also remember th a t not all cultures 
define identity in exactly the  same manner. In fact, we know that, 
“the  idea of self (and, therefore, of personal identity also) is not a 
discrete psychological entity in all cultures” (Hoare, 1991: 49). And 
as you can well imagine, lack of self-concept significantly affects  
the  way th a t  identity is construed.
Consequently, I believe this means th a t  there is a need for a
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range of frameworks to  explain ethnic identity formation processes. 
Most importantly though, our theories will have to  be able to  account 
for the  dynamic nature of social relationships through time. They 
will also have to  recognize th e  fact tha t, unless th e  society is 
geographically isolated, genetic and cultural borrowing are bound to  
occur. We can find an example of exactly this kind of framework in 
the  expanding area of ‘ethnogenetic theory’.
E th n o g e n e t ic  T heory
Ethnogenetic theory is, for all practical purposes, a response
to  the  use of cladistic (i.e. biological) models for explaining culture
change. As opposed to  cladistic methods, ethnogenetic models
allow for much greater exchange of cultural material between ethnic
units of varying sizes. The essential difference between these  two
approaches has been summed up nicely by John Moore.
The fundamental issue is historical- the  ex ten t to  
which language, culture, and biology coevolve in human 
societies. If human societies have consistently 
maintained ethnic boundaries in their evolution, then 
all kinds of human characteristics- language, culture, 
and biology- should have coevolved within these  
boundaries, and it should be simple to  describe these  
events in a single theory....But if ethnic boundaries of 
human societies are b e s t  considered as fragile,
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permeable, or illusory, then other kinds of models 
would be more appropriate; namely those  th a t  allow 
language or culture to  change, or intermarriage to  take 
place, without affecting other aspec ts  of language and 
culture (1994: 12).
Furthermore, we must always bear in mind th a t  there are many 
representative examples of both situations to  be found throughout 
history. So, the  key then is to  be able to  know which model to  use in 
any given situation. Typically, the  only time th a t  cladistic 
explanations are appropriate is when th e  particular population has 
remained geographically isolated for a significant period of time.
Social C o n flic t
Social conflict can effectively be viewed as the  source of the
process of ethnogenesis, in the  sense th a t  oftentim es identities are
constructed  for use as a political tool. Hence, if we are looking at
long-term social change in a situation th a t  is in no way isolated, we
must not only assume th a t exchanges are taking place, but we must
also know to  what degree they are occurring. However, we must also
remember tha t there are usually more than ju s t  two actors on the
landscape at any one time. In fact, there are a multiplicity of
competing in te rests  involved in most situations.
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In the  past, it has been recognized that, “enmities and 
reciprocal antagonisms also maintain th e  total system  by 
establishing a balance between its component parts” (Coser, 1956). 
Thus, certain system s can enjoy relatively long periods of stasis, 
before being upset by a redistribution of power, if conditions remain 
favorable. As I mentioned before, th e se  relationships, just like 
group boundaries, need to  be maintained; so they are not as ‘natural’ 
as they may seem to  some people.
If history has taugh t us anything it is th a t  collapse is an 
inevitability for all social sys tem s (Yofee, 1988). In part because 
the  amount of energy input required to  maintain social cohesion 
becomes to  great. For instance, in the last two hundred years or so, 
m ost of the  former colonial powers have opted to  relinquish control 
of their pro tectorates. And this trend towards independence has 
spawned many new identities as the  former colonial satellites 
strive to  establish them selves on the  world stage.
In direct contrast to  this trend towards independence are 
cases where populations are absorbed or extinguished by encroaching 
se ttlem en t. This is really the  antithetical process to  ethnogenisis, 
it is tan tam ount to  a loss of cultural autonomy.
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A ssim ila tion  and  E x tin c tio n
There is a rather large body of evidence to  suggest tha t
contact between cultures can have catastrophic effects. Whether 
through design or unintentional coincidence, vast populations can 
disappear virtually within one generation. When this happens, the 
survivors are confronted with a dilemma. Usually, if their 
immediate group remains intact then there really is no significant 
challenge to  their loyalty. However, if their population is so 
decimated th a t  it no longer functions like a group, then individual 
members may be forced to  assimilate into another identity.
Moreover, I believe th a t  there  are basically three basic
con tex ts  where assimilation, and in extrem e cases  extinction, is 
likely to  occur. The first deals with situations where disease has 
led to  rapid population loses. In instances such as these , the  
remaining members are forced to  seek entry into other groups. The 
particularly interesting thing about disease, as a vehicle of 
ethnocide, is tha t populations do not have to  be in direct contact for 
epidemics to  have drastic effects. Because many indigenous groups 
in North America aggregated a t s e t  rendezvous in the summer and
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disbanded for the  winter, infected carriers could wipe out complete 
lineages.
The second context, in which assimilation is likely to  occur, is
produced when one population conquers and absorbs another 
population. This situation posed an array of problems for colonial 
managers who had to  decide what law codes the  natives should be 
held to. One of the  central functions of the  Federal government is to 
incorporate the  component populations into one cohesive producing 
unit. And it is in the  bes t in terest of this superordinate, national 
identity th a t  peaceful relations are maintained. Though it may not 
practice equal trea tm en t, th e  national government is quiet efficient 
a t  suppressing openly violent conflicts within its jurisdiction.
The last context th a t  I want to  identify occurs when 
populations migrate into a new area and begin to  com pete with the 
in situ identities. Depending on the  circumstances of the  migration 
and resulting se ttlem ent, groups can either retain their autonomy in 
the  new place or they can be absorbed by the  surrounding population.
B oundary  M ain tenance
For m ost groups differentiation begins with the  adoption of
symbols, practices or language tha t are distinctive and which help 
to  perpetuate  and strengthen imposed boundaries. There are even 
instances where certain groups can merge and establish new 
boundaries in defense of a common enemy. In fact, this is the  case 
with m ost nationalist identities and the  United S ta te s  is a 
particularly notable example of this phenomena. For over two 
hundred years this national identity has managed to  unite a widely 
divergent population of indigenous peoples and foreign immigrants 
into one cohesive unit competing in a fledgling world market.
As was mentioned earlier, research in th e  realm of social 
identity theory (Tajfel, 1971) indicates th a t  subjects 
characteristically hold widely divergent perceptions of in-groups 
(i.e. groups which they were a part of) and out-groups, irregardless 
of how they are defined. In general, subject tend to  describe 
members of their own group in much greater detail than they would 
members of another group. The end result of this process of 
differential attributions, which incidentally follows group lines, is 
prejudicial behavior. As such, whole groups of individuals can 
become units of competition and group membership then becomes a 
political tools which can be utilized by the  individual to  secure
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grea ter  mobility within society.
As Frederick Barth (1 9 6 9 )  has so adeptly pointed out, social 
groups are maintained by their boundaries. Boundaries establish 
autonomy and create cohesion. Therefore, much of our attention 
should be devoted to  these  dividing lines. In the  formation of a new 
identity it would seem th a t boundary formation, through the 
adoption of distinct symbols, speech or the  like, is a critical 
process. Yet as fixed as th e  boundaries may seem, th e  ethnicities 
defined by them show an amazing amount of fluidity dependent on 
context. As the  author, Marcus Banks, has pointed out when 
describing Barth’s ideas,
Barth tried to  show th a t  ethnic groups are socially 
constructed  (subject to  environmental constraints) and 
tha t the  content of th e  groups-in term s of both ‘culture’ 
and personnel- has no a priori existence or stability.
That is to  say, it is not so much the group which endures 
as th eidea of the group (Banks, 1996: 12).
However, it is also important to  note  the  inherent dangers in 
treating cultures as bounded entities. This tendency can cause one 
to  severely underestim ate the  amount of interactions taking place 
between actors on any given landscape. Unless a particular culture 
exists in isolation for any significant period of time, it will be
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subject to  exogenous forces of varying degrees. Unfortunately, many 
ethnographic tex ts  contribute to  the  perpetuation of an axiomatic 
view of the  social world as a mosaic of discontinuous and definite 
cultural difference, rather than a seamless web of overlapping and 
interweaving cultural variation.
C o n c lu s io n s
The important thing to  s tress  here is th a t  social identity, even 
ethnicity, is fluid and subject to  historical forces. Thus by focusing 
on the  transitional periods, where identities are challenged or shift, 
we can gain a b e t te r  understanding of ethnic identity formation 
processes. By looking a t diverse example and trying to  draw out the  
commonalities we can begin to  think about theory building, assuming 
th a t  our comparisons are controlled and limited to  a few salient 
fea tu res .
In situations where a particular ethnic identity persists, it is 
important to  examine how it was able to  assimilate changing 
conditions and remain a prominent social identity. This is what I 
hope to  dem onstrate  through examination of the  three forthcoming 
case studies. Each of the  three examples, which I have chosen,
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represents a unique situation in term s of identity development and 
maintenance. Each can shed light on the  process by which ethnic 
identity becom es either a social tool or a social handicap.
Eventually, our explanatory framework m ust becom e flexible 
enough to  account variation in the  way th a t identity is defined in 
different cultures. It must allow for differences in th e  way tha t 
group membership is defined, it must recognize tha t some social 
barriers are more permeable tha t others. For instance, the  barriers 
imposed in the  Indian cas te  system  are much less permeable than 
the  barriers of the  american class structure.
It is also important to  identify situations which require 
ethnogenetic explanations as opposed to  cladistic models. In other 
words, “the  g rea te s t  task  facing researchers of ethnogenesis is 
determining how often human societies undergo these  radical 
linguistic and cultural transitions....That is, how much of the current 
diversity in language is due to  rapid, ethnogenetic processes, as 
opposed to  slow, cladistic processes” (Moore, 1994: 18).
The next three chapters focus on three either emerging or 
changing ethnicities. In any event, they are all in transition with 
uncertain futures. The extrem e examples are to  be found in the
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present-day Metis and the Rastafarians because neither of these  two 
groups are presently sustained by a land base. Both are essentially 
displaced populations th a t  had to  build their new identities out of 
fragm ents of their former cultures and elem ents of their newly 
encountered cultures.
Rastafari
On November 2, 1930 a prophesy was realized in the  ascension 
of Ras Tafari Makonnen to  the  throne of Ethiopia. The Emperor, 
crowned Haile Selassie, was described as exhibiting the  true aura of 
a king (Mosley, 1964). More importantly though, Haile Selassie was 
and is considered to  be a messiah by members of the  Rastafarian 
movement, th e  majority of whom still inhabit the  island of Jamaica 
in the  British West Indies.
It seem s pertinent, right off the  bat, to  mention th a t it is hard 
to  talk about Rastafarianism as a structured  ethnic identity because
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there is a general disdain for leadership among them, with the  
obvious exception of King Selassie who was actually seen  to  be the  
living God.
Additionally, there  is a strong anti-government sentim ent 
among Rastas due to  the  fact tha t they have been stripped from their 
homeland and enslaved during their previous encounter with what 
they consider to  be similar institutions. However, I should caution 
tha t one should not underestimate the  cohesive power of such a 
decentralized structure . Rastafarianism is experienced by its 
dedicated constituents  a t  a very elementary level. It is, in every 
sense, a powerful spiritual m ovem ent with definite s truc tu re  and 
s tric t codes of conduct for the  loyal observer.
With the  above preface in mind, I contend tha t the  original 
e lem ents which provided the  contex t in which Rastafarianism 
developed in Jamaica go back to  1655; the  time of the  British defeat 
of th e  Spanish and their subsequent possession of the  Island.
The Spaniards, finding them selves outclassed by the  
British, sailed from th e  north coast of Jamaica for Cuba 
and left their slaves to  th e  British. But the  slaves had 
ideas of their own. Although we have no true records of 
th e  trea tm en t of Spanish slaves in Jamaica up to  1655, 
we may assume from the  behavior of the  Spanish slaves
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th a t  they  were discontent with slavery, for they soon 
sought freedom in th e  hill country where they  fought a 
grueling war to  the  death. These Spanish slaves came 
to  be called “Maroons” (Barrett, 1977: 30).
As this passage indicates the  seeds  of insurrection were 
planted early and found sanctuary in Jam aica’s isolated hill country. 
As a result of this effective resistance movement, Jamaica has 
experienced several violent upheavals in its relatively short history. 
Obviously, th e  British colonial governm ent did, from its inception, 
ultimately succeeded  a t quelling revolutionary m ovem ents in her 
colonies through its military s treng th , bu t th ey  were significantly 
less successful a t  containing th e  rhetoric of d iscontent th a t  is a 
common feature  of all oppressed societies.
Consequently, the  rastafarian ethnicity m ust be understood in 
th e  con tex t of oppression. It is a grass roots movement th a t  was 
bom  ou t of th e  conflict with th e  almost exclusively white colonial 
elites. As such, color has become a primary ethnic boundary marker 
for th e  Rastafarians who often collectively refer to  th e  dominating 
white power structu re  by th e  term  ‘Babylon’.
Faced with such adverse conditions, th e  newly freed black 
population of Jamaica was inspired by the  belief th a t  they might
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return and be repatriated in their country of origin, Ethiopia. Marcus 
Garvey, native Jamaican and one of the  most outspoken black 
nationalists of the  1920s, openly advocated an exodus back to  Africa 
(Fax, 1972; Cronon, 1955). Although this mass migration has not yet 
taken place, m ost Rastas still believe th a t  it will, sometim e in the  
future, when they  will assume their true position as the  chosen 
people. To fully comprehend this belief, one must first understand 
th a t  many Rastafarians believe themselves to  have much in common 
with th e  exiled twelve Tribes of Israel.
Much of Garvey’s rhetoric has been incorporated into the Rasta 
ethos; especially his prophesy of 1916. Prior to  his departure for 
th e  United S tates, Garvey s ta ted , “Look to  Africa for the crowning of 
a Black King, he shall be the  Redeemer” (Barrett, 1977: 67).
As one might expect, th e  years of anticipation amplified the  
expression of hope among Jamaicans and when Haile Selassie came 
to  power in 1930 many believed a new era was a t hand. Even though 
he ruled a land half a world away, Selassie became the  ultimate 
manifestation of the  sacred for Rastafarians. Given Selassie’s 
s ta tu s , one can well imagine tha t his death caused a crisis for many 
who believed in his divine nature. Seeking answers, “the  brethren
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looked to  (Bob) Marley, the  best-known Rastafarian in the  world, to  
comment on this unsettling metaphysical development. ‘Jah Live’ 
was his response. ‘Jah live because you can’t  kill God” (Jacobson, 
1995: 50).
There is little doubt th a t  the  coronation of Haile Selassie was 
an important event in the  Rastafarian cosmology, however it did not 
directly lead to  the  development of this identity; though it is the  
namesake. The real seed  of crystallization for the  Rastafarian 
movement was provided by a minister in Kingstown by the  name of 
Leonard Howell. By the  year 1930, Garvey’s destiny had taken him 
beyond Jamaica, and this provided an opportunity for Howell, along 
with Archibald Dunkley and Joseph Hibbert, to  s te p  in and assert 
leadership.
Howell, the  most prolific of the  three, openly preached the  
following six ten e ts :
1) hatred for the  White race
2) th e  complete superiority of the  Black race
3) revenge on Whites for their wickedness
4) the  negation, persecution, and humiliation of the
government and legal bodies of Jamaica
5) preparation to  go back to  Africa
6) acknowledging Emperor Haile Selassie as the  Supreme Being
and only ruler of the  Black people (Barrett, 1977: 85).
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As one might expect, such ideas did not sit well with the  
Jamaican government and Howell was eventually arrested, and then 
sen tenced  to  two years in jail for his seditious activities. Upon 
release, he receded to  hilly stronghold near Sligoville, Jamaica 
appropriately known as the  ‘pinnacle’. There Howell and many of his 
followers crea ted  what would become an example of the  
prototypical Rasta camp; roughly governed by a small number of 
elder/chiefs. Life in the  ‘pinnacle’ was described by the  professor 
Barrett thusly, “Howell served as chief (African style), and was 
reported to  have taken thirteen wives for himself. For a living, they 
planted native cash crops, among them  the famous ganja (marijuana) 
herb th a t  has remained the  cen ter of the  m ovements ritual practice” 
(1 9 7 7 :8 6 ) .
When the  police got word of Howell and his camp hiding out in 
an old Maroon stronghold they quickly moved to  disband these  early 
Rastafarians, perhaps sensing the  danger such congregations could 
pose. Eventually, many of the  early initiants of Rastafarianism 
would take their ideas down into the  slums of the  major cities of 
Jamaica, especially Kingstown, where they could take root and 
propagate. Not coincidentally, the  them es th a t  Rastafarianism
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embodies are consistent with much of the  life experience of those in 
Jamaica who are still being oppressed; only this time through 
economic restrictions instead of institutionalized slavery.
The other direction th a t  Rastafarianism took after 1960 lead 
to  the  establishment of bush camps, reminiscent of the  ‘pinnacle’, 
sca tte red  throughout the  hinterlands of Jamaica. And it is in these  
two specific environmental contexts  tha t the  movement of 
Rastafarianism has evolved. However, now th a t  some of the 
background has been laid out, pertaining to  the  development of this 
ethnicity, I think it wise to  shift perspectives and examine the  some 
of the  ‘cultural s tu f f  which cons titu tes  th e  Rastafarian ethnic 
group.
In th e  case of Rastafarianism, the  major players on the  
landscape were th e  English colonial government, missionaries from 
a variety of Christian denominations, and th e  former slave 
population of Jamaica. This matrix has since become more complex, 
but for now I wish only to  deal with the  early developmental period 
of Rastafarianism; circa 193 0 -1 9 6 5 .
More specifically, I wish to  examine the  boundary between 
Christianity and Rastafarianism because the  la tte r shares much of
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th e  former’s theology, but with certain crucial modifications. The 
reason for this discrepancy is th a t  Rastafarians believe th a t  the  
te x t  of the  Bible has been altered in the  course of its many 
translations to  suit th e  purposes of Babylon. Hence, th e  discovery of 
truth, through the  scriptures, must take into account the  possibility 
of alteration.
One of the  m ost striking distinctions between the  two is the 
Rastafarian emphasis on the  totality  of creation, not its 
separateness. This is evidenced by th e  Rasta concept of ‘I & I’, 
which refers to  the  element of ‘Jah ’ or the  Supreme th a t  is inherent 
in all things. This, in part, explains why m ost Rastafarians are 
vegetarians preferring a diet which they  call ‘i-tal’; referring to  
things being in their natural s ta te .  Though probably the  m ost 
commonly recognized ethnic marker of the  Rastafarians would have 
to  be the  dreadlocks. Indeed there are many myths concerning their 
origin, but their functional value is really th e  pertinent issue.
Hair has always been a problem in Jamaican society in 
th a t  it is often used as an index of social difference; 
for example, fine, silky hair has always been 
considered “good”, while woolly or kinky hair is 
frowned upon. The person with fine, silky hair was 
considered b e t te r  and more socially acceptable than
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the  typical Negroid type. Thus the  dominant hair 
styling of the  Rastafarians is a symbol of the  
contradiction in the  society; the  Rastafarians are 
unconsciously ridiculing the  ambivalence of the  
society (Barrett, 1977: 138).
Whether or not a hair style is capable of ridicule is not at 
issue, what is important is the  fact th a t  dreadlocks are an 
unmistakable cultural marker and form part of th e  boundary of this 
ethnic group.
Another popularized marker is the ritual use of ganja by many 
Rastafarians. Most believe th a t  this practice grew out of the  
interpretation th a t  marijuana is the  holy herb mentioned in the  
Bible. Whatever the  case, ganja is used in ceremony, where it is 
smoked out of communal chalice pipes as an aid to  meditation. The 
smell is supposed to  be pleasing to  ‘Jah’.
Us vs. Them  H euristic
As was noted earlier, Rastafarianism must be understood in
the context of conflict. The movement is based on almost 350 years
of defiance, som etim es openly violent and sometim es subtly
coercive. This being the  case, it then seem s plausible to  view
ethnicity as an adaptive stra tegy , in this battle , with a biological
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basis. I know th a t this assertion will bother some so let me 
quantify it by stating th a t  it is the  impulse to  form groups tha t is 
biologically based. Humans are invariably social animals and we 
cannot deny the  implications of this fact. However, the  attributes 
the individual group may chose to  ‘key in on’ (i.e. the  ethnic 
boundary) are definitely subject to  modification by circumstance 
and, a t  times, design. Unfortunately, one of the  most used heuristics 
is based on appearance because tha t is one of the  first things we 
experience when interacting with others.
In post-colonial Jamaica the  distinction betw een different 
ethnic groups was an easy one because it was based primarily on the 
degree of color in one’s skin and this characteristic was easily 
apprehended. Unfortunately, this was often the  only measure of 
value tha t was applied to  human life.
Even after slavery was abolished, being Black still carried a 
large stigmatism with it. Though people of color do comprise a 
numerical majority in Jamaica, they  have had a difficult time 
gaining access to  positions of power, with a few notable exceptions. 
Moreover, the  Rastafarians in particular have remained isolated 
from the  mainsteam s ta te  institutions by choice, as they believe
58
th a t  said institutions are, by their very nature, evil.
As I mentioned earlier, many sought repatriation in Ethiopia.
But in Jamaica, m ost a t tem p ts  to  incorporate the  large body of slave 
labor into th e  existing capitalist s truc tu re  proved unsuccessful.
And, it is in reaction to  th e  limited mobility of Jamaican society 
th a t  Rastafarianism has really showed its power.
It gave the  destitu te , those  who had no hope of improving their 
living conditions in one lifetime, a sense  of solidarity in suffering. 
Rastas take pride in th e  work and many are notable sculptors or 
general craftsm en. They handle th e  sparse  tim es extremely well, 
citing th e  parable in th e  Bible concerning seven years of famine for 
seven years of plenty.
Before going any further on the  topic of group identities I have 
to  re ite ra te  th a t  there  are two analytically distinct processes of 
group perception which results in the  ‘us vs. them ’ dichotomy. One 
is self-categorization which, for all practical purposes, occurs 
within th e  ethnic boundary, and involves characterizing members of 
one’s own group. The second is social-categorization which takes 
place outside and across th e  boundary (Jenkins: 1997). In addition, 
it is important to  note th a t  in th e  past, racial distinctions have been
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emphasized in out-group ascription more than they have for 
characterizing ones own group.
The rites and rituals of both everyday existence and ceremony 
are what makes Rastafarians different from any other ethnicity.
They have a shared common history; most of the  original slave 
population in Jamaica came from the  Ashanti tribes of West Africa. 
And this is evinced by the  fact tha t many of the  words used in 
present day Jamaican s tre e t  language have Ashanti roots. 
Interestingly, th e se  fundamental them es have provided a rallying 
point for th e  Rastafarians and o ther civil rights m ovem ents whos 
focus is on heritage. They have realized tha t the  greater their 
numbers, the  greater their efficacy.
To other civil rights m ovem ents in Jamaica the  Rastafarian 
position has been considered to  be extreme because it is, a t  times, 
openly militant. However, In the  1950s a t tem p ts  were made to  unite 
the  various Black factions of Jamaica. The first effort came from 
the  Ethiopian World Federation, which hollowly talked about the  
possibility of repatriation. Unfortunately, the  criteria they 
proposed to  use to  select candidates would have excluded many 
Rastafarians because most did not possess a marketable trade.
60
The second, and more substantial, result of such efforts was 
the  Rastafarian convention of 1958. Professor Leonard Barrett 
explaines tha t, “The convention not only disclosed many aspects  of 
th e  cult hitherto unknown to  th e  public, but gave the  Rastafarians 
unprecedented publicity” (1974: 165).
The other analytical perceptual process th a t  was mentioned 
earlier was social-categorization. This process works from th e  top  
down in the  social hierarchy. And th e  effects  of social- 
categorization are then often internalized by the  dominated society, 
so th a t  th e  existing power structure  is reified and rarely challenged. 
Historically, th e  Rastafarians have seen  through the  guise of their 
colonial d ictators and challenged, a t every level, the  legitimacy of 
the  elite class.
On the other side of the coin, most of the  elite whites see  the  
Rastafarians as m alcontents who refuse to  do anything to  b e t te r  
their living conditions. This is an easy position for the  elite class 
to  hold because it masks the  fact th a t  they are largely responsible 
for the  continued poverty of th e  lower classes. As noted social 
psychologist Elliot Aronson has pointed out, while describing 
African-Americans in our own society,
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We imprison these  people in overcrowded ghettos; and 
we se t  up a situation in which th e  color of a person’s 
skin almost inevitably unleashes forces th a t  prevent 
him from participating in th e  opportunities for growth 
and success th a t  exist for white Americans... He 
becom es painfully aware of the  opportunities, 
comforts, and luxuries th a t  are unavailable to  him. If 
his frustration leads him to  violence or if his despair 
leads him to  drugs, it is fairly easy for his white 
brother to  sit back complacently, shake his head 
knowingly, and a ttribu te  this behavior to  some kind of 
moral inferiority (1972 : 131).
Aronson’s s ta tem en t does a good job of illuminating a deeper 
trend in how we characterize our own and other groups with which 
we constantly interact. It shows ju s t how errant our judgm ents can 
be if we don’t  take the  time to  identify the true nature of a given 
phenomena, like group attributions for instance. We are forced to 
act on our biases in the  absence of adequate information which 
c rea tes  a lot of temporary answers th a t  need to  be readdressed 
constantly .
A ss im ila t io n  an d  E x tin c tio n
The model of ethnicity th a t  I have explicated thus far would be
b es t described as a conflict model (Coser, 1956) with constantly
changing power relationships. Although the  overall s truc tu re  of
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Jamaican society has not changed drastically in the  last two hundred 
years, this does not indicate apathy or acceptance on the  part of the 
subjugated. As was previously mentioned, several uprisings have 
plagued th e  Jamaican authorities since they assumed power over th e  
Island.
To quiet the  insurgents, the  colonial government has tried 
several different m ethods of assimilation. None of which have 
proved very effective a t giving the former slave population of the 
Island access to  the  resources tha t would be necessary to  elevate 
their standard of living en masse.
Compounding this condition is the  fact th a t  virtually all of th e  
farmable land in Jamaica is already occupied. Without the  prospect 
of a land base, individuals, m ost of whom are unskilled, are forced
to  move into towns where they have access to  only the  lowest
* •*
5‘
paying positions.
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All of th e se  factors have created  a situation in Jamaica which
r  '
is hierarchically segm entary  and base'd largely on ethnicity.
•% / *
Although slavery has been officially abolished in Jamaica,
conditions still exist th a t  perpe tua te  the  existing class divisions,
«
and th e s e  class divisions mostly; follow the  sam e lines as racial
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divisions, even when one takes into account the  more recent waves 
of migration.
To b e t te r  explain th e  existing power relationships in Jamaica,
I think it appropriate to  employ a personal metaphor. You see, I was 
walking in the  woods the  other day, examining the  overarching 
canopy provided by the  surrounding hardwoods when I was struck by 
an epiphany. It involved the  second growth sapling tha t were 
growing up in the  proverbial shadow of their bigger brothers. And 
for argum ents sake, we will say th a t  the  saplings represent the  
subordinate ethnicities of Jamaica. Then any of the  larger trees  in 
the  forest would rep resen ts  Jam aica’s white elites.
The saplings com pete, on a daily basis, for the  meager 
allotment of nutrients th a t  make it through the  canopy’s broad 
reach; simply to  insure their continued existence. But a t some point 
one of the  great hardwoods will have to  fall. And when this happens 
it will c rea te  an all out race betw een individual saplings to  fill the  
void in the  canopy.
This simple biological m etaphor says more than I could in ten 
pages of te x t  because it illuminates the  relationship between ethnic 
factions and the  larger culture of which they are a part. The other
64
thing th a t  this model illustrates is the  role th a t  resistance plays 
within th e  larger power structure .
This them e has been touched upon earlier, but it requires 
further clarification a t  this point. Most theorist, writing on the  
issue of ethnicity, place the  emphasis on imposed ethnicity or 
social-categorization while largely neglecting th e  power and 
ramifications of resis tance m ovem ents.
Ethnic identities do not naturally exist; they  are fluid like 
power relationships and as such, need to  be maintained, both 
internally and externally. Thus choice, in group affiliation, and 
factionalization within groups c rea tes  a sense  th a t  ethnicity is 
situational or dependent on context. As such, ethnicity can be seen 
as a tool, m ost often utilized to  further ones social or political 
goals by granting mobility in times of crisis. Additionally, it is this 
aspec t of ethnicity th a t  c rea tes  the  possibility for assimilation into 
another ethnic group. Eventually if the  impetus for assimilation is 
strong enough, extinction becomes a real possibility.
Up to  this point in time, the  Rastafarian ethnicity has derived 
s treng th  through its ideological opposition to  the  Jamaican 
government, but tha t does not mean tha t this will always be the
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case. In many respects , Rastafarianism owes its existence to  the 
class struggle in Jamaican society, but if circumstances change so 
th a t  Black Jamaicans are granted access to  an equitable allotment 
of resources then Rastafarianism might be abandoned.
Hypothetically, th e  liberated population might form a different 
ethnic group based on them es tha t are more consistent with new 
conditions.
In C onclusion
What this hypothetical situation dem onstra tes  is th a t  ethnic 
identity is, in part, a function of how deeply a given identity is 
internalized by its members. Now bear in mind, this applies for both 
internal and external processes of perception; for both processes do 
exhibit a certain amount of autonomy.
There is an old adage attributed  to  Elanore Roosevelt which 
s ta te s  tha t no one can make you feel inferior without your consent. 
This a g reat way of summing up the  functional value of 
Rastafarianism. The Rasta e thos provides a sort of mental armor for 
its members, so th a t  they can weather the  inhumane conditions of 
Jamaican g h e tto  life without losing hope.
66
Much of the Rastafarian’s s treng th  is derived from their 
tradition of struggle and the  knowledge of their once great empire. I 
am referring of course to  the  Ethiopian empire, of which Egypt is 
supposed to  have been a part, which ac ted  as the  cradle for 
civilization. Rastafarians are very aware of the  fact tha t their 
ancestors had built an empire in Africa th a t  would be of comparable 
complexity to  the  later Greek c ity -s ta tes.
The testimony of the  ancients and many Egyptologists 
have confirmed th a t  this Black civilization, however, 
was unable to  withstand the  barbaric hordes which 
surrounded the  Mediterranean basin. By 814  B.C., with 
the  Roman victory over Carthage, the  Black 
civilization lost its power. Thereafter, they  were 
oppressed by all races (Barrett, 1977: 74).
The gap between have and have-not is very apparent in present 
day Jamaica with the  elites now living in th e  very hill territories 
th a t  the  Maroons had sought shelter in a few hundred years earlier. 
Many inhabitants of the  island live in shanty towns constructed  with 
w hatever materials are available. Amazingly conditions have not 
noticeably improved for the  landless poor in Jamaica, most of whom 
are black, since England abolished slavery in all her colonies. Yet in 
the  face of all of this, the  Rastafarians have never lost faith in their
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worth as God’s chosen people.
History will bear witness to  the  fact th a t  ethnic groups 
coalesce and disband frequently in response to  changing conditions, 
and most of the  time they are loosely based on the  vestiges of some 
common ancestor. Ju s t as nations modify their borders and 
populations through time so do ethnic groups. In a sense ethnicities 
are a microcosm of nationalities, which are oftentim es identified 
with specific races.
Though it must be emphasized once again, races, like cultures, 
should not be trea ted  as bounded entities. Genes do not create 
disjointed categories of humans, cultures do. It cannot be s tressed  
enough th a t  prejudice is the  result of misapprehensions about the 
‘o ther’. And it is only through dispelling these  myths tha t we can 
ever realize the  true potential of the  human animal.
However, this effort will be further confounded by the  general 
ignorance surrounding how genes work to  build the  individual. There 
needs to  be greater clarification concerning what exactly genes are 
capable of determining. In other words, it is easy to  rationalize 
som eone’s s ta tion  in life by referring to  their genetic composition 
or genetic propensities, but more commonly th e  particular situation
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is a result of exogenous forces over which the  individual has no 
control.
In th e  case of the  Rastafarians, their is no genetic inferiority 
which lead them  to  their current position in the  Jamaican social 
hierarchy. They were a conquered people, valued and transported to  
a foreign land mostly for their labor. It would have been easy to  
lose their African identity in lieu of th e  restrictive new system  
they were faced with. Instead, they chose to  emphasize elements of 
an older identity tha t had served them well in the  past. And even 
today, Ethiopianism continues to  bond these  exiled people while in 
diaspora.
Lastly, I would like to  discuss Rastafarianism as it exists 
today. Without a recognized body of leadership this movement has 
breached th e  border of th e  isolated Island of Jamaica and spread 
throughout much of the world. There are, I think, two main reasons 
th a t  Rastafarianism’s m essage has been so widely recognized. One 
is the  fact th a t  it is an innately appealing perspective for groups or 
individuals who find them selves scraping out an existence in th e  
wake of th e  capitalist machine. Secondly, Rastafarianism is closely 
linked with Christianity, though of a more indigenous flavor as
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opposed to  the  Eurocentric form th a t  was presented  by missionaries.
In the  United S ta tes  of the  1950s and 60s, there was a rebirth 
of African identity rising out of the  civil rights movement. 
Rastafarians who traveled to  the  U.S. a t this time brought many of 
the  techniques and them es back with them  to  Jamaica, further 
adding to  their appeal. Additionally, as a result of interactions 
between Jamaican Rastafarians and those  who had migrated to  the 
United S ta te s  various organizations were created , most notably in 
New York and San Francisco, which gained Rastas greater publicity 
and increased acceptance.
Currently, when m ost people think about Rastafarianism they 
relate to  its manifestation in Reggae music. This is the  popularized 
side of this ethnicity, but it remains very consistent with the  
them es of early Rastafarian development. For example, I would like 
to  conclude with an excerpt from the last song, on the last album, 
th a t  Robert Nesta Marley recorded before his death on May 11, 1981.
Old pirates, yes, they rob I 
Sold I to  the  merchant ships,
Minutes after they took I 
From the  bottom less pit.
But my hand was made strong 
By th e  hand of the  Almighty.
We followed in this generation, triumphantly. 
Won’t you help to  sing these  songs of freedom? 
Cause all I ever have: redemption songs,
These songs of freedom (Marley, 1980).
Metis
The Metis represen t a good example of how political and 
economic forces can coalesce to  produce hybrid ethnicities. In 
effect, this ethnic group was created  as a result of repea ted  and 
continuous European-lndian interactions. Moreover, th e  Metis 
ethnicity was established ra ther rapidly as a distinct identity 
category, separa te  from both Euro-American and Aboriginal 
ethnicities, while a t  th e  sam e time intermingling with both. 
Unfortunately, in the  last two hundred years or so, th e se  people have 
becom e displaced due to  th e  near constan t pressure of encroaching
71
72
white se ttlem en t and a general lack of government support.
Yet despite the lack of a fixed land-base, these  people have 
managed to  maintain their opposition, to  varying degrees, and 
thereby distinguish themselves as unique agents in the  pantheon of 
identities which became subsum ed by the  Canadian national identity.
In more recent times, the  members of this ethnic category 
have s ta rted  to  reorganized and are beginning to  gain recognition in 
the  courts. According to  author Joe Sawchuck, “the  Metis who 
appear to  fade from the  scene after their last disastrous uprising in 
1885, were able to  come back in the  mid-1960s when the political 
climate was particularly favorable to  th e  kind of ethnic politicking 
the  group could practice” (1978: 12). In effect, by uniting and 
contesting their non-status, they have been able to  secure the 
resources needed to  once again achieve some level of self- 
determination.
The Metis people are often called “the  children of the 
Canadian fur trad e”: as the  European fur traders in the  
East needed wives, they simply chose them from the 
tr ibes whose territory overlapped the  trade-mainly 
Cree and Ojibwa, both being close relatives within the  
Woodland culture of Algonquian-speaking Indians. That 
was in the  17th century, when the  French traders 
outnumbered th e  British ones: this explains why the
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new hybrid race received a French name. From then on, 
as the  fur trade expanded westward, the  Metis 
proliferated in Rupert’s Land (Douaud, 1983: 73).
Those Metis tha t chose to  remained in the  East were, for the 
m ost part, assimilated into th e  dominant Euro-Canadian culture. 
However, another significant portion of these  people decided to  
follow th e  rapidly expanding w estern frontier, as employees of the 
Northwest and Hudson Bay Companies.
As agents of the  fur trade, the early Metis acted as a sort of 
bridge between the  predominately European managerial classes and 
the  Native American suppliers who performed the  bulk of the 
trapping activities. For this reason, se ttlem en t patterns tended to  
cluster around the  major trading centers. To the  point that, “at 
every little trading post the  number of Metis increased dramatically, 
so tha t by 1800 most posts had a number of Metis homes grouped 
around the  walls” (Sealey and Lussier, 1975: 8).
On these  semi-fixed se ttlem ents, the  Metis employed a range 
of subsistence activities which included, but were not limited to, 
hunting buffalo, farming and m ost importantly, trading. It has been 
noted tha t, “this general adaptation exhibited highly variable coping 
s tra teg ies, forming a continuum in work regimens and level of
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integration into trading company hierarchies” (Jarvenpa and 
Brumbach, 1985: 309). And it was in the  area of trade in particular 
tha t the  Metis enjoyed a distinct advantage, as it was the  Hudson 
Bay Company’s policy, during the  18th  and early 19th  centuries, to  
only give full-blooded Native Americans temporary seasonal 
positions. “On the  other hand, mixed-bloods could obtain regular 
employment, but they were largely excluded from the  officers ranks. 
Thus, racist thinking entered  into th e  fur trade employment 
practices of the Hudson Bay Company well before 1 8 2 1 ” (Ray, 1982: 
97).
We m ust bear in mind tha t life on the  frontier was never 
static , for one thing, animal populations were quickly influenced by 
th e  relentless activities of company tappers. And in fact, “the  
diaries and journals, from th e  late 18th century through 1821, give 
the  impression of a steady decrease in the  beaver and other valuable 
animal populations around Lake Winnipeg and along the 
Saskatchewan” (Carlos, 1982: 165). In many of the  Prairie 
provinces, it seem s th a t  an entire way of living was essentially 
undermined in the  course of only one or two generations.
By the  end of the  19th century, the Plains Metis found
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them selves In a situation where they possessed  neither land nor a 
legal identity in the  eyes of the  Canadian government. Then there 
was a long period, from the end of the 19th century to  around the 
late 1950s, in which the  Metis identity seem ed to  virtually fall from 
sight. However, during this time some Metis continued to practice a 
traditional lifestyle in th e  relative isolation of rural communities 
without the  aid of the  federal government. Others chose to  wander 
the country, finding work and food where they could.
In describing the  fate of the  Metis during this period, the 
author Patrick Douaud has identified four main ‘ty p e s ’ which 
characterize th e  various Metis populations; they  are as follows:
a) integrated: those Metis who had se ttled  definitively and had 
successfully adapted  to  Euro-Canadian culture;
b) living on the  fringe of white se ttlem ents: the  Road Allowance 
people...wandering from job to  job and destitute;
c) living on the  fringe of reservations: a common phenomenon;
d) living in small isolated communities: with an economy based 
on fishing, hunting, trapping, this group bes t preserved the  
traditional Metis identity and was to  provide m ost of the  Metis 
leaders th a t arose after World War II (1983: 75).
One institution which did help to  maintain the  integrity of th e  
Metis identity during the  early part of the  20 th  century was the
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Roman Catholic Church. To its credit, “the  Catholic Church, mostly 
French-speaking, urged the Metis to  preserve their French language 
in the  same way th a t  it later urged the  Irish to  revive the  Gaelic 
tongue” (Douaud, 1983: 78). Thus, the  fate of many Metis 
populations were significantly influenced by th e  a tti tu d es  of 
members of the  various European groups with which they had 
contact. In other words, the  Spanish and French inhabitants of the 
New World tended to  be much more appreciative of Native cultures 
and customs. As a result they did not put much energy into tying to  
suppress the  expression of traditional practices. And one area, 
where this trend was particularly noticeable, was in their 
respective policies concerning intermarriage with th e  Indigenous 
inhabitants of the  Americas. As a general rule, th e  northern 
European groups were less to lerant of intermarriage with Native 
American populations than were the  southern European groups.
To s ta te  the  obvious, intermarriage was key to  the 
maintenance and expansion of the  Metis identity, yet a t  the  same 
time, traditionally, the re  was a strong tendency towards endogamy 
in many Metis marriages. This inclination also helped a g reat deal to  
perpetuate  the  fledgling Metis ethnicity because not only were
77
individuals encouraged to  seek  unions with Native American 
partners, but it was also common in traditional Metis culture to  take 
a m ate from within the confines of one’s own group.
As I have pointed out previously, in opposition to  the  many 
pressures to  assimilate, the re  were a se lec t few institution like the  
Catholic Church which did work to  maintain the  autonomy of the  
Metis identity by encouraging the  maintenance and transmission of 
the  French language. The o ther factor which played a significant 
role in preserving the  Metis ethnicity into the  present was the  vast, 
y e t informal communication network which functions in this 
community. “The Metis communication network, owing its existence 
to  common in terests and a consciousness of kind, in turn functions 
to  maintain th e se ” (Slobodin, 1964: 50).
Nevertheless, for roughly all of the  20 th  century, the  policies 
of th e  Canadian government have failed to  recognize the  Metis as a 
distinct legal entity. Moreover, the  token a ttem pts , made by the  
Canadian government, to  assimilate the  Metis into the  developing 
economy had little hope of succeeding. Patrick Douaud has argued 
th a t  there  were tha t there were three reasons why the  a t tem p ts  to  
affect a transition failed, they  are as follows:
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1) the Metis were expected to  adapt quickly to  the new 
life s ty le ;
2) White speculators often manipulated them  into selling 
their scripts for a pittance; and
3) seldom did th e  White authorities show much understanding 
or provide thorough aid (1983: 76).
In reference to  this issue, a recent article written by Paul 
Chartrand of the  University of Manitoba charged tha t, “Canadian 
governm ents are still in breach of their constitutional obligation to  
identify and define the  rights of the  Aboriginal peoples. Thus, the 
constitutional meaning of ‘Metis’ is not ye t determ ined” (1991: 21). 
Not only does this create  a situation whereby the  s ta te  and federal 
governm ents are unable to  make constructive policy decisions, but it 
also makes it all but impossible for the  Metis to  make legal claims, 
for land and mineral rights, within th e  legal system .
At this point, I think it is important to  point out th a t  there is 
an essential dichotomy between the way tha t the  Metis are viewed, 
or more appropriately, not viewed, by the  Canadian government and 
the way tha t they view themselves. In short, there should be no 
doubt th a t  the  modern Metis are descendants of a people who helped 
to  establish Canada as a force in the  world market, yet they have
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continually been denied a history by the  very nation which they 
helped to  found.
Us vs. Them  Heuristic
Canadian geographer Arthur J. Ray has observed that, “the
Metis have continued to  receive remarkably little a tten tion  until
very recently” (1982: 92). I believe tha t one of the  reasons for this
neglect is tha t, prior to  the  last thirty or so years, Metis heritage
was not really emphasized, except for in a few isolated
communities. Only relatively recently has this identity once again
emerged, to  be widely asserted.
One place tha t it has recently become actively advanced, is in
the  Canadian legal system. In the  Canadian province of Alberta, the
Metis have come to  be legally defined as, “those people who fail to
m eet the  legal or social requisites of either Indian or White, and yet
are the  offspring of bo th” (Hatt, 1969: 19). It seem s as though this
should be a fairly obvious assertion, but even getting a court to
recognize the  Metis as a distinct ethnicity, has in the  past, proved to
be rather problematic.
Part of the  problem is derived from the  fact the  Canadian
government and th e  various Metis collectives seem  to  hold divergent 
perception of what it means to  be Metis. In other word, being Metis 
is often a m atte r  of perception; on average though, Metis definitions 
of membership tend to  be more liberal than the  rigid, legal 
definitions. In general, “Aboriginal people have been split into the  
‘s ta tu s ’ and ‘o ther’ groups in more ways than one. The legislated 
definitions and policies have obscured the  relevance of heredity, 
kinship, cultural and o ther factors in determining personal and group 
identity” (Chartrand, 1991: 19). Beyond that, there is also a good 
deal of uncertainty as to  just what kind of right Aboriginal people 
are entitled to. And this is something which is continually being 
te s te d  and re te s ted  in the  courts. With respect to  this point,
Canada has officially taken th e  position in the  
international forum th a t  “peoples” in section 35 of the  
Constitution Act. 1982 should not be interpreted as 
supportive of the  notion tha t Canada’s Aboriginal 
‘groups’ are ‘peoples’ in the  sense of having the  right 
to  self-determination under international law (ibid.,
1991:10).
One can see  th a t  this is a very important distinction to  make 
because it denies the  legitimacy of claims th a t  Indigenous groups 
should have th e  right to  exist and function without th e  interference
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of the central government. So tha t, a t the  same time tha t it is 
sta ting  its own authenticity under international law, the  Canadian 
governm ent is denying this fundamental right of self-determination 
to  certain entities which exist within its borders.
Furthermore, these  type of repressive tactics, on th e  part of 
the  Canadian government, are present on all levels of the  
bureaucracy. There is a rapidly growing body of research evidence 
which indicates tha t,  “Metis and Aboriginal peoples are 
differentially impacted by th e  operation of the  justice system  as it 
now exists, th a t  the  effects  are adverse, and th a t  systemic 
discrimination is prevalent” (Barkwell, 1989: 122). In practice, we 
can see  th a t  the  Canadian government is not only denying the claims 
of the  Metis, they are actively seeking to  keep these  people in s ta te  
where they are not able to  co n tes t the  powers which control their 
fate .
One way th a t  this is accomplished is by dictating the  way th a t  
this group is defined. The Canadian government has a vested 
in terest in keeping the  membership of this ethnic group at a 
minimum, so th a t they may limit any compensation tha t the  courts 
may see  fit to  grant them. From the very beginning, the Metis have
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had to  accept th e  definitions and attributions which were placed on 
them by the dominant Euro-Canadian society. They have not been 
granted the  ability to  perpetuate  their own labels and 
characterizations. If they had, they probably would not have been 
marginalized to  the  ex ten t tha t they are today.
In C onclusion
A community is rarely bounded by fences and signpost: 
more often it is shaped by the  overlap of adjacent 
cultural continua of social organization, language, 
dress, diet, etc.; and its boundaries are integrated as a 
series of cues (Douaud, 1987: 216).
In the case of the Metis, the lines which separate  the 
respective Euro-Canadian, Native American and Metis ethnicities are 
particularly transparent. In fact, many commonalities can found 
between th ese  th ree  traditions, and perhaps this is why it was 
supposed th a t  the  Metis could be easily assimilated into the 
Canadian national identity. In addition, it has been proposed that, 
“the  Metis have been ‘forgotten’ because in a society which has some 
difficulty comprehending social or ideological overlaps and seeks to  
impose clear-cut, distinctive labels on all its members, no one 
knows on which side the Metis are” (Douaud, 1983: 86).
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They are a people who incorporate many elements of these  two 
other discrete identity categories. This being the  case, they  are 
afforded a small amount of leeway concerning how they choose to  
define themselves.
One of th e  difficulties in pinpointing cultural markers 
arises from the  fact th a t  we are dealing with a 
relatively recent reformulation of a once distinct 
tradition. Also, there is a tendency for Metis to  
suppress cultural differences th a t  might precipitate 
further discrimination (Sawchuck, 1978: 40).
For the  first part of the  last century, it was not considered 
acceptable to  asser t  this particular ethnicity, except within a few 
limited contexts. However, times have changed and for whatever 
reasons, th e se  so-called ‘fo rgo tten ’ people are beginning to  
challenge the  term s of their domination. They are speaking out 
against the  premise th a t  the  Canadian national identity should be 
able to  claim autonomy at the expense of another.
In 1982, amendments were made to  the  Constitution of Canada
which were designed to  clearly establish the  aboriginal rights of 
th ree  different groups, the  Metis, Inuit and Indians. These 
am endm ents aimed to  basically reaffirm the  type of, “rights derived 
from original occupancy” (Chartrand, 1991: 4). Unfortunately, like
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many other complicated constitutional issues, th e  reforms which 
were m andated in th ese  am endm ents are still not fully implemented.
Justice is something which is slowly coming about for the  
Metis, and it seem s as though they are beginning to  have more 
success a t pressing their claims through litigation. Indeed, some of 
the  roadblocks which had previously existed, have been removed, but 
the  situation is still far from equitable.
These days, there should be little doubt th a t  the  shared
elements of ancestry and language have maintained the  Metis 
identity through decades of oppression. And now, because the  
political climate has shifted, making it once again acceptable to  
profess membership in this group. Furthermore, the  Metis have 
recently made them selves known in the  realm of national politics.
The Canadian government, in its 1982 Constitutional amendments, 
recognized the  Metis explicitly and acknowledged th a t  they were 
indeed entitled to  a land base. Unfortunately, they have been rather 
slow in moving to  rectify th e  situation.
Northern Ireland
Even as I write these  words, the  conflict in Northern Ireland is 
still actively being played out. Though, a t the  sam e time, it appears 
th a t  th e  political climate is certainly changing in such a way th a t  a 
lasting peace could soon become a viable goal. Finally, after more 
than thirty years of openly violent conflict, it now seem s possible 
th a t  both th e  Ulster Unionists and the  Catholic Nationalists are 
ready to  legitimately consider an end to  British rule in the  north of 
Ireland. However, it is also true tha t the  motives of those  who favor 
terminating England’s presence in the  northern six counties are 
som ew hat varied.
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On one side of the  argument, there  are the Ulster Unionists, 
who I believe recognize th a t Britain is eventually going to  withdraw 
her support, it is really just a m atte r  of time. Ultimately, this 
process was s e t  in motion back in 1921 when the  British government 
ac ted  to  partition th e  island. In so doing, England relinquished its 
control over m ost of the  Ireland, with the  exception of the  northern 
six counties. There, in the  north, P ro testan ts  were concentrated  and 
in fact formed th e  majority.
After the  partition of Ireland in 1921, one party, the  
Unionist Party, was in uninterrupted power in the  new 
s ta te  of Northern Ireland until 1972. The institutions 
of the  s ta te  were frequently used by the ruling party to  
discriminate against th e  nationalist population who 
were in a numerical minority (Rolston, 1998: 27).
In part due to  their superior numbers (56.9%  of Northern 
Irelands to ta l population belong to  P ro testan t denominations), but 
also because of continued British military presence, the  Ulster 
Unionists have, in the  last eighty or so years, managed to  remain in 
control of their destiny in the  north.
However today, it seem s as if the  fears, th a t  many Northern 
Irish P ro tes tan ts  have expressed in the  past, concerning the  
continued support of the  crown are beginning to  appear to  be well
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founded. Though they go well beyond the  commonly cited observation 
th a t  if unification does occur, they  would lose their majority s ta tus . 
Since 1920, Northern Ireland has become quite reliant on the annual 
subsidies provided by Britain, which currently amount to  roughly 
five billion dollars (O’Toole, 1998).
For England, this rather large, annual investment is beginning 
to  represent a situation of diminishing returns. There is a real 
sense throughout the  country th a t  a peace deal would significantly 
help to  alleviate this fiscal burden, which, for many English, 
amounts to  nothing less than national welfare. Not to  mention the  
fact th a t  public opinion has s ta rted  to  turn against the heavy handed 
tactics  which characterized the  struggle during the  early 1970s.
For a number of reasons, it now looks as if the  situation in 
Northern Ireland is ripe for reform, the  main question which remains 
to  be answered, is will th e  P ro tes tan t majority willingly agree to  
relinquish their dominant position in the  government? One can see, 
th a t  a t this point in time, the  ethnic identity of the  Ulster Unionists 
is facing immanent changes, as the  Catholic majority of the  Irish 
Free S ta te  seeks to  consolidate their control over the  whole island. 
“In o ther words, Britain will leave Northern Ireland if and when
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Irish Nationalists can g e t Ulster Unionists to  agree th a t  it should” 
(O’Toole, 1998: 58).
I think it safe to  say that, in the  past, the  Catholic Nationalist 
and Ulster Unionist identities have developed simultaneously in a 
context of conflict. One result of this type of protracted ethnic 
friction is th a t  people and a ttitudes tend  to  become polarized 
between these  ethnicities. In o ther words, “conflict has heightened 
a ttachm ent to  traditional values which in turn have been be tte r  
bu ttre ssed  to  resist encroachm ents of secularization and pluralism” 
(Wallis e t  a/., 1987: 294). One can see tha t loyalties run deep on 
both sides of this divide, which helps to  explain why it has been so 
hard to  achieve a substantial se ttlem ent for ending th e  hostilities. 
We must remember th a t  there is a long history of hatred in both 
populations, dating all the  way back to  events surrounding the 
original colonization of Ireland by the  British.
The colonization of Ireland decimated many aspects  of 
indigenous culture, either directly - for example, the  
Penal Laws, which outlawed the  practice of the  
Catholic religion and prevented Irish natives from 
inheriting land, holding public office and owning 
weapons - or indirectly - for example, the  Famine, 
which not only halved th e  Irish population through 
death  and emigration, but also led to  profound cultural
changes in areas such as religious practice and 
a ttitudes to  marriage. Protestantism  became the  
established religion, where most of th e  people were 
Catholic. English became the  dominant language for a 
people whose parents and grandparents had spoken 
Gaelic. The dominant symbols of nationalism were 
British, not Irish. Irish culture was suppressed  
(Rolston, 1998: 25).
From the  beginning, th e  older Catholic identity was 
marginalized by the  British colonizers. So that, by 1920 this 
relationship of dominance had become so entrenched tha t m ost Irish 
P ro testan ts  would not even consider the  thought of Irish 
independence. Consequently, “Northern Ireland was formed as a 
result of th e  unwillingness of th e  P ro testan t majority in the  
northeast of Ireland to  be assimilated into th e  Irish Free S ta te  when 
it was formed in 1 9 2 1 ” (Wallis et al., 1987). Obviously, it would be 
ludicrous to  assume th a t the  Ulster Unionists are going to  surrender 
their autonomy easily. They have repeatedly dem onstrated th a t they 
do not want to  be ruled by Dublin. In short, they dread the  thought of 
being absorbed by the  Catholic majority of the  Irish Free State.
For th e  Catholic minority in Northern Ireland assimilation is a 
fa te  tha t they know all too  well. When Northern Ireland was created 
in 1921 it is es tim ated  th a t  about half a million catholics ended up
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on, “the ‘wrong’ side of the  border” (O’Toole, 1998: 56). In the  north, 
the  Catholic minority has suffered through years of blatant 
discrimination a t the  hands of the  P ro testan t Unionists.
Like many postcolonial se tt le r  societies, Northern 
Ireland is composed of two ethnic communities, Irish- 
Catholic-Nationalists and B ritish -P ro testan t-  
Unionists, arranged hierarchically in a relationship of 
domination and subordination. This hierarchical 
relationship of P ro tes tan t domination has always been 
maintained primarily by force and has therefore, 
always produced resistance. The presence of this 
resistance in turn was used as a rationalization and 
justification for th e  development of a culture of terror 
aimed a t repressing it, and this in turn has now led to  
the  evolution of a culture of resistance in the  Catholic 
ghettos . The basic contradiction in repression 
em erges here-namely, th a t  while it is intended to 
counter resistance, in operation it c rea tes  or 
exacerbates it (Sluka, 1995: 74).
In th e  preceding paragraph, Sluka identifies a very important 
point concerning th e  formation of violent resistance movements, 
like th e  Irish Republican Army for example. He correctly a sse r ts  
th a t  the  level of force used by British, and other forces to  counter 
Republicanism have been matched by the resistance a t every level.
In short, “whenever s ta te  repression has increased (e.g. Internment, 
Bloody Sunday, e tc.) support for the  violent opposition to  th e  s ta te  
has increased” (ibid., 86). By adopting heavy handed tactics,
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Unionists have merely strengthened  the  resolve of their opposition.
For m ost Catholics in Northern Ireland, religion forms a large 
part of their identity. In fact, “66 percent of Catholics chose 
religion and nationality as their m ost significant social identities” 
(Smooha, 1980: 260). Consequently, many rely on their faith to draw 
them  together, it has provided a sense of hope in the  face of 
overwhelming political and economic disadvantage. For Northern 
Irish Catholics, religion forms the  basis of resistance, though 
resistance may take on many different forms. In the  extreme 
situation, th e  Irish Republican Army, has since its inception, 
advocated direct and violent resistance against their oppressors. 
However, for th e  majority, resistance has a more mundane meaning. 
“Everyday forms of resistance include things like refusing to  fill out 
census forms, graffiti writing, throwing s tones  a t Brits and 
‘Peelers’ (police), refusing to  give date  of birth to  soldiers, e t c ” 
(Sluka, 1995: 83).
We m ust bear in mind th a t  fears for religious freedom, on the 
part of the  Irish P rotestants, are what ultimately led to  the  1920 
partition of the  island. In th e  years following the  1916 Catholic 
uprising, “m ost P ro te s tan ts  in Ireland feared losing their religious
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identity within a s ta te  dominated by the  Catholic Church” (Crighton 
& Mac Iver, 1991: 130). Thus, it is apparent tha t religion is an 
important diacritical marker for both  populations, nevertheless 
s ta te  sponsored Protestantism  does occupy a distinct position of 
advantage, a t  least in the  north.
Ideologies of resistance have also led to  a contemporary 
revival of elements of an older Gaelic identity. The em ergence of 
several Irish language programs and the  creation of the  Gaelic 
Athletic Association in th e  years following the  partition provide 
evidence of this reawakening process. Slowly but surely the  
Catholic Republicans are gaining momentum in their efforts 
towards, once more, unifying th e  island. Ironically, some observers 
have argued th a t the efforts of the  s ta te  government in Northern 
Ireland have actually helped to  fuel the  passions of the  Republican 
opposition; thereby aiding the  cause.
Us vs. Them  H euristic
It has been observed of th e  respective ethnic identities in
Northern Ireland tha t, “you could either conceal it and be rigidly 
defenseless or proclaim it and invite a t tack” (O’Toole, 1998: 61). In
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the  case of the  Catholics, the  area where their identity was most 
strongly proclaimed was in th e  Nationalist g h e tto s  of Northern 
ireland. There in the  midst of so much poverty and ill sentim ent the 
Catholic Nationalist identity becam e a rallying point for those  who 
had been mistreated by their own government. And they derived 
s treng th  from supporters  and relatives living in th e  Irish Free S ta te  
and abroad.
Their m essage was broadly appealing because it spoke against
the  type of tyranny and repression tha t exist throughout the world. 
Many of the  them es, inherent in the Republican movement focus on 
liberation from th e  inequality pf their p resen t situation. It is this 
type of rhetoric which helps to  firmly delineate th e  boundary 
between these  two communities.
In an article in th e  journal, Ethnic and Racial Studies, John
Whyte identified seven factor which function to  maintain the  ethnic 
boundary between Protestan t and Roman Catholic populations in 
Northern Ireland, they are as follows:
(1) th e  Churches themselves;
(2) the  Orange Order;
(3) social ranking;
(4) political differences;
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(5) residential segregation;
(6) separate  education;
(7) endogamy (1986, 219).
As was discussed before, religion is one the  most important
a ttr ibu tes  of the  two respective identities in Northern Ireland.
There is a very clearly spelled out ideological difference between 
these  two faiths. Though it is also important to  point out th a t  there 
is g rea te r  factionalism apparent in th e  various P ro testan t 
denominations. Therefore, the  Catholic community represents a 
united front, whereas P ro testan t politics are often plagued by 
infighting.
One place where a majority of Protestants  can find common 
ground is within the  ranks of the  Orange Order. This society, “which 
is open to  male P ro testan ts  of all denominations, is closed by its 
rules to  Roman Catholics” (Whyte, 1986: 222). Most of the  time, the  
Order works in subtle ways to  support th e  unionist effort, however, 
during marching season these  people put on very visible displays 
aimed a t  showcasing their common identity.
The overall social s truc tu re  in Northern Ireland is relatively 
unchanged since the  island was divided. In general, Catholics are
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disadvantaged in term s of economic sta tus . They tend to  have higher 
unemployment rates and are more likely to  occupy unskilled 
positions. As a result, s te reo types which cast Catholics as 
unindustrious and less intelligent than P ro testan ts  have become 
reified in the  popular consciousness.
This ability to  learn stereotypic cues without recourse 
to  personal experience may also play an important role 
in the  acquisition of such denominational cues within 
Northern Ireland, where most individuals are confronted 
with the  evidence of sectarian division through the  
media (Stringer & Cook, 1985: 405).
The last four factors th a t  Wyte (1986) identified were all
indicative of th e  amount of social separation which exists between 
these  two groups. Their past histories of mutual prejudice have led 
to  a situation which is characterized by social and ideological 
isolationism. In describing the  circumstances in Northern Ireland, 
Elizabeth Crighton and Martha Mac Iver (1991) portray this type of 
protracted ethnic conflict as ‘identity-driven’. They go on to  s ta te  
th a t  the  conflict is, “the  result of an underlying ‘fear of extinction’ 
th a t  grows out of the  experience of being a vulnerable ethnic group 
living with memories of persecution and m assacre”(ibid.: 127).
From 1690 on, Catholics in Northern Ireland have continued to
resist the  political and economic roadblocks which were institu ted  
to  keep them ‘in place’ at the  bottom  of the  social hierarchy. They 
have found strength  in their numbers and are currently fighting for 
essential freedoms th a t  th e  rest of Ireland gained almost eighty 
years ago.
In C onclusion
At this point it should be apparent tha t the  main sticking
points for both sides, in the  ongoing peace negotiations, have been
ideological. Despite mounting pressure for unification, the  Ulster
Unionists are bound and determined to  maintain the  power tha t they
currently possess. For years, Northern Irish Pro testants  have been
subjected to, “a concerted propaganda campaign aimed at vilifying,
demonizing, and generally misrepresenting Republicans -
particularly IRA ‘te rro r is ts ’ - for political purposes” (Sluka, 1995:
81). This being the  case, is it any wonder tha t these  people would
fear th e  loss of British support?
For Ulster P ro testan ts-m ost of whom are unionists, 
th a t  is, they wish to  maintain th e  link with Great 
Britain-the Irish Republican’s claim to  sovereignty over 
th e  whole island, and the  rejection of the  Northern
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Ireland s ta te  by the  large Catholic minority in the  
North, have continually amplified th e  political salience 
of Pro testantism  (Wallis e t  a/., 1987: 294).
Up until this point, th e  Ulster Unionists have perpetuated  their 
identity by continually repressing the  Catholic minority living in the  
northern six counties. It is important to  recognize that, in a very 
real sense, Protestantism  could not exist without the  opposition 
provided by Republicanism. These two ethnic identities are 
complementary to  each other, and can be shown to  even converge on 
certain points; after all they are both part of the  Christian faith.
Following th e  partition of the  island in 1921, virtually the  
only thing th a t  Northern Irish Catholics were left with was their 
identity. This ac t essentially made them into a people in exile. They 
were a t a social and economic disadvantage when compared with 
their counterparts living in the  Irish Free S tate . However today, it 
seem s as if th e  political climate is ripe for reform. Owing in part 
to  broadbased economic changes tha t have occurred as a result of 
Britain’s entry into the European Union. England is beginning to  
favor decreased involvement in Northern Ireland, which may 
ultimately result in a single unified Irish s ta te  ruled from Dublin.
Summary
As I have repeatedly tried to  illustrate, social identity is 
constitu ted  through the dual processes of self and social- 
categorization. Furthermore, social identity should be viewed as 
multidimensional, in th e  sense  th a t  we all possess a variety of 
social identities a t  any given time. In some situations, gender may 
become the  m ost salient feature of social identity, in another, race 
may be emphasized. In any event, as a result of this variability, we 
tend  to  construct our social categories along several different lines.
These categories are by and large associated with the
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major social divisions-gender, class, race, ethnicity- 
th a t  separa te  those  who are routinely privileged from 
those who are not. Cross-cutting markers tend to 
becom e stereotypically associated  with th e se  social 
categories, if not actually demanded by their members 
in practice (Hollandet a/., 1998: 130).
Furthermore, by strategically manipulating our manifold 
identities, we are able to  achieve greater  mobility in the  larger 
community. Thus we notice, in the  study of ethnicity, tha t certain 
identities can either be s tressed  or suppressed as circumstances 
may dictate.
In certain situations, we can see a revival of specific 
elem ents of an older identity. For example, in Ireland, the  Easter 
rising of 1916 occurred at the  end of what was known as the  Gaelic 
Revival (Rolston, 1998). Hence, many Northern Irish Catholics feel a 
g reat deal of affinity for their Gaelic ancestors and the  spirit of 
resistance which they possessed.
Let me reiterate th a t  this study was primarily designed to  
provide a controlled comparison of three unique contexts  of ethnic 
identity formation. As such, th e  common feature between all of 
th e se  th ree  respective identities is th a t  they have all developed as a 
result of colonial efforts towards expansion. The Rastafarians,
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Metis, and Northern Irish Catholics are all groups which have 
ultimately coalesced in response to  colonial oppression.
In all cases, I hope to  have dem onstrated  tha t ethnic identity, 
as a specific manifestation of social identity, is always being 
con tested  a t some level. As such, it is subject to  punctuated 
periods of modification. We cannot ignore the fact, when studying 
ethnicity, th a t  all identities exist within a vast system  of power 
relationships. Therefore, we must allow for the  fact th a t  these  
relationships are extremely dynamic, and as such, they must be 
continually maintained. In each of the  three cases I examined, the  
intensity of resistance was directly related to  the  degree of 
oppression.
Moreover, it was found th a t  resistance was especially strong 
because it was firmly grounded in shared ancestry, language, and 
culture. Obviously, these  common features have remained salient 
and have led to  the  perpetuation of each respective identity. By 
stressing such common elements, th e se  groups were able to  
maintain their cohesion in th e  face of mounting pressures to  
assimilate into th e  majority population.
In addition, it is important to  emphasize th a t  all th ree cases
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involve marginalized peoples, some of whom clung viametly to  their 
respective identities despite near constan t persecution. As 
circumstance changed, the  political climate either became less or 
more favorable for active expression of ethnic identity. However, I 
submit th a t  ethnicity always functions as a political tool for those  
who chose to  focus on it.
We must remember though, tha t in many situations, there is a 
great deal of overlap between populations; in term s of both 
individual members and cultural material. It seem s th a t  some 
boundaries are more permeable than others, and a t certain times, 
this allows for the  individual to  move between populations.
As I have tried to  stress, ethnic identity is in many ways a 
m atte r  of perception, in th e  sense th a t  it is the  individual who 
initiates th e  process of self-categorization. And this really gives 
the  individual a good deal of power when determining which groups 
they  wish to  affiliate with. However, I should also quantify tha t 
there are limits placed on the  type of groups tha t we can seek 
membership in. For instance, P ro testan ts  of all denominations are 
able to  seek membership in the  Orange Order, but no Catholic would 
ever be allowed to  join. In short, the  other side of social identity is
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social-categorization, which m ediates th e  self-identifications th a t  
we inevitably make. Furthermore, social-categorization works 
proactively, by strongly influencing our perceptions and stereo types.
And this is a major part of the  problem of discrimination, 
these  preconceived cognitive representations (i.e. schem as) are so 
basic to  the  decision making process tha t they are not often 
scrutinized. Only by recognizing these  biases, can they be countered.
We must appreciate th a t  one of the  major sources of personal 
bias is the  in-group, as we often incorporate the  perceptions of 
o thers who we affiliate with, when formulating our own beliefs. By 
referencing the  in-group, the  individual not only gains information 
concerning group norms, s /h e  also gains in positive self-identity by 
validating th a t  they are part of the  group.
The social group is seen to  function as a provider of 
positive social identity for its members through 
comparing itself and distinguishing itself, from other 
comparison groups, along salient dimensions which 
have a clear value differential (Commins & Lockwood, 
1979 :218).
It is also important to  note th a t  the  value differential varies 
between the  in-group and the  out-group. In general, individuals tend 
to  be more favorably biased towards members of their own group. In
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reference to  this fact, we do know tha t individuals perceive 
members of their own group as more heterogeneous, or complex than 
non-members (Aronson, 1972). However, all too  frequently, 
oversimplified s te reo ty p es  are able to  persist because of a lack of 
dissenting evidence. In situations where two or more competing 
ethnicities are in constan t contact, th e  salience of the  respective 
identities is commonly amplified. And it is in this context 
particularly, th a t  we should expect to  see  a clear definition of 
boundaries functioning to  produce social separation.
The boundaries of ethnic groups are symbolically 
represented - as the bearers of a specific language, 
religion or, more generally, ‘culture’; but they  are also 
materially constitu ted  within th e  s truc tu res  of power 
and wealth. Thus ethnicity should be regarded as 
materially and symbolically constitu ted , as a 
system atic  feature beyond the  reach of individual 
actors, as well as a dimension of individual action 
itself (Fenton, 1999: 25).
One of the  reasons I believe there has been so much confusion 
in the  past, surrounding the  concept of ethnicity, is tha t it is a 
phenomenon which is both grounded in ancestry and symbolically 
constructed  a t the  same time. This feature of ethnic identity 
crea tes  a situation whereby some a ttribu tes are more subject to
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local forces. Though ancestry is one a ttribute  which appears not to 
be as prone to  drastic, random shifts, with the  possible exception 
being instances where large populations are displaced through war 
or economic hardships.
Therefore, we must also be able to  account for the  
possibilities of extinctions and revivals when constructing 
frameworks for studying ethnic identity. I believe tha t, when 
culture change is viewed at th e  individual level, it becomes 
increasingly noticeable ju s t  how fluid social identity can be. So 
why is it th a t  we seem  to  insist on treating human social groups as 
bounded, s ta tic  entities? Perhaps it is something fundamental to  
th e  way th a t  we have come to  rigidly conceptualize social 
organization; we seem to  have a good deal of difficulty 
accommodating individuals who may straddle the  border between 
several different groups.
Only recently, have researchers such as John H. Moore (1994), 
s ta r ted  to  caution tha t we must pay particular attention to  the  level 
of social interactions between groups, to  see  if rhizotic or cladistic 
models are more appropriate for explaining culture change. And I 
contend th a t  our past tendency to  favor cladistic explanations has
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aided in reifing the  notion th a t  cultural boundaries are fixed and 
impermeable.
It should be clear, from my case study of the  Metis legal 
situation in Canada, th a t  som e significant groups are being excluded 
when rigid definitions of ethnicity are imposed by the  S ta te  and 
Federal governm ents. In o ther words, social-categorization 
processes do not usually take into account the  existence of fringe 
groups. In term s of the  Canadian government, perhaps their long 
standing persistence on not legally recognizing th e  Metis reflects 
their hope th a t  th e  Metis would eventually assimilate and forget 
their claim to  the  right of self-determination.
Though we m ust also realize th a t  social-categorization is but 
one aspect of social identity. The other side of the  coin, self­
categorization, also works to  promote the  development of the  ad 
populum dichotomy by delineating what we are from what we are 
not. In effect, the  process of social comparison is what ultimately 
perpe tua tes  the  illusion th a t  there are only two mutually exclusive 
categories; us and them. Through the  creation of the  cultural other, 
and th e  depersonalizing tendencies which result, we begin to  
facilitate th e  persecution of those  who we perceive to  be not like
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‘u s ’.
It is important to  always remember th a t  ethnicity is not just 
the  subject of academic discourse, there are very real economic 
implications related to  ethnic identity. Not only in the  sense tha t 
ethnicity exists within an established network of power 
relationships, but also because the  United S ta tes  government 
allocates funding for many social programs based on the population 
s ta tis tics  tha t it collects. This being the  case, the  methods which 
they employ to  define the recognized ethnic categories then become 
a political issue.
To say the  least, there  are significant economic incentives for 
maintaining th e  status quo, for keeping marginalized people on the  
fringe. Any change tha t does come will inevitably mean a 
redistribution of power tha t may lead to  challenges of th e  power 
relationships as they currently exist. For many minority ethnic 
groups, the  creation of a strong, broadly appealing identity is one 
way th a t  they may gain new membership and increased political 
efficacy.
The Rastafarians represent a poignant example of how a social 
m ovement can be transformed into the  functional equivalent of
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ethnic identity. Ultimately, th e  Rastafari identity was able to  reach 
beyond the  borders of the  tiny island colony of Jamaica to  all 
corners of the  globe. One of the reasons th a t the  Rastafarian 
identity spread so quickly was tha t it drew upon them es th a t were 
familiar to  oppressed people the  world over. The Rastafari embodied 
a m essage of spiritual rather than material rewards. For a people 
who had little more than the cloths on their backs, they spoke out 
against the  false prosperity of the  elite class in Jamaica. As pawns 
in a capitalist bureaucracy, they resisted all a t te m p ts  at 
assimilation, choosing instead to  live a life of poverty, while 
focusing on spiritual development.
When all is said and done, we cannot change the  catastrophic
V
instances of culture con tact which have marred our recent history.
We can however learn from our past mistakes so th a t  we do not 
repeat them  in the  future. I feel th a t  by stressing the  differences 
which distinguish various social identities, we underscore the  
fundamental relatedness of all members of our species. In net 
effect, it is th e se  perceived differences which form th e  basis for 
competition between human groups who believe themselves to  be 
unique and superior to  all others.
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